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ABSTRACT 
Over the past 40 years, state, market, and civil society actors have created working forests. 
Although there are myriad definitions of working forests, the dominant definition focuses on 
multifunctionality – incorporating social, economic, and environmental interests and uses. Working 
forests are contextualized in broader political, economic, and legal processes like parcelization, division 
of property rights, and financialization. In an attempt to engage diverse stakeholders in management 
and conservation decisions, theses forests are controlled by state, market, and civil society actors 
creating hybrid governance arrangements. The forests that are both created and indicative of these 
processes raise concerns for forest and ecosystem fragmentation and contests among and within 
organizations. These concerns threaten the viability of these working forests and call into question the 
creation of future working forests.  
This study investigates two working forests in the United States that exhibit characteristics of 
the political economic processes mentioned above. I use neo-institutional theory from sociology to 
motivate the use of accountability mechanisms to evaluate working forests. These mechanisms give 
actors (accountors) the ability to receive information and sanction other actors (accountees). The study 
of accountability mechanisms affords the analyst the opportunity to understand the goals and 
relationships from which individual organizations seek to gain and maintain legitimacy. Within working 
forests, the study of accountability mechanisms provides the analyst an opportunity to evaluate the 
extent to which various goals and actors are brought into productive and stable tension through a series 
of proposed checks and balances.  
In this study, I qualitatively described and analyzed formal accountability mechanisms. I 
searched for formal accountability mechanisms for each organization holding a property right. From this 
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information, I constructed the structure of accountability relationships, making note of both the type 
and nature the mechanisms. Moreover, I used qualitative content analysis to describe the objectives 
present in the accountability mechanisms. 
My findings demonstrate the diversity of goals and accountability relationships within working 
forests. I find that accountability mechanisms found in conservation easements and other agreements 
germane to the construction of the working forest are necessary to build relationship between 
organizations embedded in different institutional domains. The information sharing inherent in these 
mechanisms likely minimizes the risk of forest fragmentation. However, most accountability 
relationships exist within institutional domains, thus diminishing the potential for information sharing 
across domains. Through content analysis, I find that most organizations mention economic, 
environmental, and social goals. This finding may lessen the risk of contests among organizations, as 
different organizations perceive that their goals and concerns are incorporated into forest management.  
There is evidence, however, of contests within organizations as groups negotiate for which goals are 
pursued within the context of scarce resources.  
Contests among and within organizations do not necessarily mean the termination of these 
working forests. Rather these goals can be brought into productive and stable tension through the 
formal agreements underlying the working forest. However, if these goals are not brought into 
productive and stable tension, there is reason for concern. Contests may lead organizations to dissociate 
from the working forests. As organizations dissociate it may create the inability to pursue 
multifunctionality. Moreover, new organizations may enter the arrangement with unknown 
consequences for the realization of multifunctionality. This study offers future analysts a way to use 
accountability mechanisms to analyze environmental governance. Overall, there is reason for concern in 
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these working forests, but more work needs to be done to find concrete evidence of organizational 
contests and lost legitimacy.  
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Introduction 
Since the 1960’s, in the United States, policy-makers, government agencies, land trusts, 
communities, and others have developed working forests. These dominant actors that shape and create 
these forests manage in pursuit of multifunctionality (McCarthy 2005; Klein and Wolf 2007). 
Multifunctional landscapes reconcile environmental, economic, and social interests and goals. The ways 
in which actors operationalize multifunctionality in working forests varies. Stakeholders, however, 
generally assume that a combination of logging, recreation, and conservation will take place in these 
forests (Wolf and Klein 2007). Despite the fact that the predominant discourses and definitions of 
working forests may exclude disempowered actors and their interpretations, I will define working 
forests as synonymous with multifunctional forests (Wolf and Klein 2007). 
Multifunctionality is frequently premised on creating an opportunity for a diverse range of 
stakeholders to express their interests and goals (Ostrom 1990; Lee 1993; Agrawal and Gupta 2005; 
Klein and Wolf 2007). This expressed need for participatory processes has also carried over into the 
creation of working forests (for e.g. see, Wolf and Klein 2007; Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012). The 
stakeholders are engaged in both the planning and ongoing operation of working forests. Although the 
planning and operation of working forests is premised on broad participation, the stakeholders that plan 
and manage the forest may hold competing and antithetical interests and goals. For instance, many 
presume that market actors pursue economic goals (e.g., commercial logging), state actors pursue social 
goals (e.g., job creation), and civil society actors pursue environmental and recreation goals (e.g., 
biodiversity and public access). The possible contests among stakeholders may occur within the same 
parcel of forestland or between parcels of adjacent forest land (Klein and Wolf 2007). 
Scholars’, practitioners’, and analysts’ assumptions of antithetical interests and goals underlying 
working forests are overly simplified (McCarthy 2005; Bills 2005; Klein and Wolf 2007). Actors within 
multifunctional landscapes generally hold a diversity of interests and pursue myriad goals. For instance, 
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certain land trusts increasingly speak to economic development, recreation, and biodiversity 
conservation, rather than speaking only to biodiversity conservation. The inclusion of once perceived 
antithetical interests into organizational practice does not necessarily lessen contests among 
organizations in working forests. Contests may still exist either among organizations in organizational 
practice or within organizations in goal setting processes. Contests among and within organizations raise 
concerns for the resilience and viability of the working forest as they may diminish organizational 
legitimacy. Therefore, analysts need to move beyond simple assessments of relationships among actors 
within working forests to understand the viability of these arrangements. 
The need to understand relationships among organizations within working forests is particularly 
salient within the modern context of forest management in the United States. Some modern working 
forests exhibit the following characteristics: parcelization – the division of one parcel into many parcels 
with different owners; division of property rights – the separate ownership of the right to access, 
manage, sell, and conserve; financialization – the ownership of forests by financial actors managed for 
returns on investment; and hybrid governance – the blurring of institutional logics within a context of 
control of the forest. Each of these developments has been demonstrated to lead to the risk of contests 
among actors (Gustafson and Loehle 2006; Ostrom 2003; Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012; Gunnoe 
and Gellert 2011; Wolf 2012). This paper focuses on working forests exhibiting each of the above 
characteristics to determine if concerns about contests are warranted.  
Scholars have studied the risk of contests among actors in multifunctional and working forests 
(Klein and Wolf 2007; Wolf and Klein 2007; Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012). These studies showed 
that there was a decreased risk of contests among organizations that incorporated goals outside of their 
“traditional” interests, furthering ideas of multifunctionality. These studies, however, through their 
reliance on survey and discourse analysis tend to focus on narrative representations of goals, 
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relationships, and contests rather than actual goals and relationships. The evaluative framework 
developed in this paper expands on previous literature by documenting expressed goals and formalized 
relationships. Moreover, the framework allows the analyst to explore both inter- and intraorganizational 
relationships. 
In this paper, I investigate accountability mechanisms to evaluate working forests. 
Accountability mechanisms create a relationship where an accountor has the ability to first receive 
information from an accountee and then sanction that accountee based on the information (Bovens, 
Schillemans, and Hart 2008). The language that creates accountability mechanisms can be found in laws, 
contracts, annual reports, and other documents. To analyze the repercussions of accountability 
mechanisms, I situate organizations within neo-institutional theory. Accordingly, all organizations need 
to be seen as legitimate: desirable, appropriate, and proper within the institutional contexts in which 
they operate (Weber 1968; Suchman 1995). Accountability mechanisms allow legitimating actors to 
determine if grants of legitimacy are still warranted or if through sanction legitimacy should be 
diminished (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Jepson 2005; Black 2008). By studying accountability mechanisms, 
analysts can explicitly determine the relationships between legitimating and legitimated organizations. 
In this framework, legitimacy is currency, and an accounting of this currency allows us to understand 
structures, relationships and dynamics. Through content analysis of accountability mechanisms, analysts 
can determine the goals that are important to assure grants of legitimacy from legitimating actors. The 
analysis of accountability mechanisms in working forests improves upon previous studies as it looks at 
actual stated goals and formalized relationships among actors. These stated goals in accountability 
mechanisms indicate processes and relationships both within and among organizations.  
 For the two cases presented in this paper, I recreate the accountability environment, meaning 
the relationships and mechanisms between accountor and accountee. Then, through qualitative content 
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analysis, I analyze the goals present in each accountability mechanism.  My work generates three 
findings. First, accountability relationships predominantly operate within state, market, and civil society 
sectors. This finding demonstrates that parcelization and fragmentation may reinforce existing divides 
among organizations in working forests. Second, financial actors within working forest predominantly 
focus on goals pertaining to returns on investment and portfolio diversification, rather than goals 
pertaining to environmental conservation, sustainability, or recreation. Third, there is little evidence of 
potential contests among organizations. The accountability environment, however, offers evidence of 
contests within organizations in these two working forests. Contests within organizations may be 
detrimental as it may lead to failure to achieve or pursue goals. Failure to achieve goals or an increased 
risk of contests may result in sanctions from accountors, thereby damaging legitimacy. Evidence in the 
accountability environment demonstrates dynamic legitimacy maintenance processes whereby 
organizations may be pressured to incorporate goals that lead to internal destabilizations. Given the 
choice, organizations that only realize damaged legitimacy from being associated with working forests 
may dissociate from the arrangement. 
In this paper, I begin with a brief review of the literature on working forests and 
multifunctionality. I then discuss the modern political economic context of forests within the United 
States. I use this discussion to limit the types of working forests I investigate. I then demonstrate how 
accountability mechanisms may be used to evaluate organizations within a working forest. I then 
recreate the accountability environment for two cases in the United States and perform a qualitative 
content analysis on the accountability mechanisms. This information allows me to create a visualization 
of the structure of accountability relationships and tables of simplified and categorized goals. These 
tools give me the ability to evaluate working forests that result from parcelization and the division or 
property rights and exhibit financialization and hybrid governance. I finish by discussing the 
ramifications of my findings.  
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Literature Review 
The Working Forest 
 Since the 1960’s, working landscapes have been developed in several ways. One such working 
landscape is the working forest. Scholars and practitioners define working forests in myriad ways. The 
most prominent definition, however, refers to working forests as forests managed towards 
multifunctionality – management that reconciles economic, environmental, and social interests and 
goals (Wolf and Klein 2007). In this way, multifunctionality and by extension working forests  offers the 
potential for landscape-scale conservation and sustainable forestry (Best and Wayburn 2001; Block et al. 
2004). A variety of processes have created multifunctional forests and a complete discussion is beyond 
the scope of this article. To briefly discuss a few legal and social processes, I will mention historical 
developments in which state and civil society actors have explicitly and implicitly pursued the 
development of working forests in the United States. These developments demonstrate the political and 
economic realities of forest management. 
 The United States government began pursuing multifunctionality in the 1960s. The passage of 
the Multiple Use Sustainable Yield Act (1960) was a major step in mandating multifunctionality. The Act 
stated forests should be “…administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife 
and fish purposes…” (Fernand 1995; Wolf and Klein 2007). The language of this act, demonstrates the 
legislature’s attempt to manage forests for economic, environmental, and social goals. Recently, the 
pursuit of multifunctionality has been codified in various regulations and agency guidance documents 
pertaining to ecosystem based management (Wolf and Klein 2007). United States government agencies 
do not necessarily state that the pursuit of multifunctionality has created working forests. As working 
forests are synonymous with multifunctional forests, however, it is clear that any forest managed under 
Multiple Use Sustainable Yield or ecosystem management can be considered working forests.  
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 Land trusts began pursuing multifunctional forests in the 1970’s through the establishing and 
proliferating conservation easements (Brewer 2003). The use of conservation easements arose as an 
alternative to buying land in fee simple because of the increase price of land and the difficulty in 
garnering political support for purchases (Brewer 2003). These easements give their holders the right to 
develop the land. Although this right is premised on development, the implicit assumptions of 
conservationists and the explicit requirements of state laws ensure that the land is not developed (Paul, 
Miller, and Paul 1994; Morrisette 2001; Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012). Within these 
conservation easements, frequently, market actors own the land, while the state or non-profit actors 
hold the development rights to the land (Paul, Miller, and Paul 1994). The resulting merger of profit, 
conservation, and recreation interests and goals makes these forests multifunctional forests. Unlike 
government actors, however, land trusts frequently referred to these multifunctional forests as working 
forests. 
 Although the above legal tools and processes were important in creating multifunctional or 
working forests, other social processes also furthered their development. In this paper, I investigate two 
working forests in the northern forest of the United States. I therefore will focus my discussion on social 
processes in this region. In this region, multifunctionality arose as a response to a cost-price squeeze in 
forestry, meaning there was both increased costs of living in rural communities and decreased means by 
which community members could earn a living (Best and Wayburn 2001; Mather 2001). Scholars 
attribute this squeeze to increasing property values in rural communities and the globalization of the 
forestry industry (Best and Wayburn 2001). Increasing property values resulted from an influx of new 
residents in rural communities that had relatively higher financial means. Globalization of forestry lead 
domestic forest products companies to downsize, thus diminishing employment in rural communities.  
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Arguably ,multifunctionality was seen as a way for rural communities to shift from economies 
premised on commodity production to economies that are premised on consumption of recreation and 
the environment (Mather 2001). This transition, however, has not been seamless as non-industrial 
private forest owners in attempt to minimize the impacts of the cost-price squeeze manage forest for 
short term economic gains through generally unsustainable practices (Best and Wayburn 2001; Klein 
and Wolf 2007). Because of the pressure towards profit maximization over conservation, 
multifunctionality is also frequently used in policy and other discourses as an attempt to harmonize 
competing economic and environmental demands (Klein and Wolf 2007).   
 Although state and civil society actors have pursued the creation of working forests, the 
definition of working forests as multifunctional forests makes most forests working forests (Wolf and 
Klein 2007). To narrow the scope of working forests, this paper investigates working forests that have 
certain characteristics indicative of current political economic contexts. This paper investigates working 
forests that exhibit parcelization, the division of property rights, financialization, and hybrid governance. 
Although working forests are frequently questioned for their ability to achieve multifunctionality and 
remain viable, working forests exhibiting the above four characteristics give particular reason for 
concern.  
Modern Context of Working Forests 
The development of working forests is situated in broader socio-economic and historical processes 
in forestry management in the United States. A major historical process taking place in forests in the 
United States is the sale of private forest land (Turner, Wear, and Flamm 1996; Best and Wayburn 2001; 
Gunnoe and Gellert 2011).  In the United States, forest land is held by public and private owners. Private 
owners are frequently categorized by scholars in terms of industrial and non-industrial (Best and 
Wayburn 2001). It is the sale of this private land since 1980 that sets the stage for the processes that 
either create or shape modern working forests. In this paper, I examine four of these processes. The 
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working forests that are either created through or shaped by these processes raise concerns for working 
forest utility and viability. Some of these concerns are explored in this paper. The four processes are: 1) 
the sale of private forest land to several owners – parcelization; 2) the holding of property rights to this 
land by several owners – division of property rights; 3) the ownership and management by financial 
actors – financialization; and 4) the control of forests by interorganizational arrangements that blur 
state, market, and civil society institutional logics – hybrid governance. 
The first two processes can be used to create working forests, while the other two shape modern 
working forests. The processes discussed above also differentially been studied  on private industrial and 
non-industrial lands. For instance, parcelization has largely been studied within the context or private 
non-industrial forest owners as a precursor to economic development (Turner, Wear, and Flamm 1996; 
Gobster and Rickenbach 2004; Haines, McFarlane, and Kennedy 2011). Scholars have generally studied 
financialization of forests within the private industrial forest ownership (Gunnoe and Gellert 2011). The 
study of working forests allows analysts to merge these scholarships, as well as synthesize these 
management literatures with legal and governance scholarship. I will now briefly discuss each of these 
processes. In the methods section, I use characteristics of these contexts to choose cases for analysis. 
Over the past 30 years, private forest owners have subdivided their property – a process known as 
parcelization (Sampson 2000). The number of owners increase as land is subdivided into parcels. 
Scholars have demonstrated that parcelization fundamentally redefines management contexts, such 
that ecological, social, and economic change is highly likely (Turner, Wear, and Flamm 1996; Crow, Host, 
and Mladenoff 1999; Gobster and Rickenbach 2004; Schulte, Rickenbach, and Merrick 2008). Many 
incidences of parcelization have caused forest and ecosystem fragmentation. This fragmentation occurs 
when forests are divided into square parcels that are heterogeneously managed (Haines, McFarlane, 
and Kennedy 2011; Cronan et al. 2010; Schulte, Rickenbach, and Merrick 2008; Gustafson and Loehle 
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2006). Divergent management practices result from a failure to share information between owners, the 
non-synchronization of timing of operations, and the perceived or realized transaction costs (Turner, 
Wear, and Flamm 1996; Crow, Host, and Mladenoff 1999; Gobster and Rickenbach 2004; Schulte, 
Rickenbach, and Merrick 2008; Cronan et al. 2010).  
 Parcelization can be used to create working forests. An owner may choose to subdivide the land 
between actors that individually pursue environmental, economic, or social goals jointly or separately.   
At forest scale, this arrangement of ownership creates multifunctionality. For example, within a forest, 
one parcel may be managed for biodiversity conservation, one parcel may be developed for real estate, 
and another may be harvested for wood. Parcelization, however, does not necessarily lead to 
multifunctionality at the parcel scale. Concerns about fragmentation in working forests arise as owners 
of adjacent parcels pursue conflicting management practices.  
One way to achieve multifunctionality at a parcel scale is to disaggregate property rights. This 
division has already been talked about in the context of conservation easements. Many property rights 
may be owned separately and exclusively. Division of property rights is different from parcelization 
because parcelization assumes that all property rights – the right to own, manage, access, and use – are 
transferred during a land transaction. Just as parcelization may lead to contests between management 
paradigms between parcels, division of property rights may lead to contests within parcels. 
Within the context of the creation of working forests, actors employ parcelization and division of 
property rights processes to suit their own objectives. Both parcelization and division of property rights 
may be used to explicitly form multifunctional forests. When this occurs, the seller of the land or the 
rights attempts to involve organizations that will ensure multifunctionality. Alternatively, when 
multifunctionality is an implicit outcome of parcelization, organizations’ differing goals may create 
fragmentation among or within parcels. Some actors, specifically land trusts, assume that subdividing 
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property rights through conservation easements may lessen this risk of fragmentation by assuring that 
development and conservation is achieved similarly on adjacent parcels. Based on this assumption, land 
trusts sometimes employ the division of property rights to achieve their overall goals in working forests. 
The division of property rights, however, does not anticipate fragmentation or contests within parcels. 
The fact that an apparent remedy to the problems of parcelization may actually create new problems 
raises concerns for the viability of working forests.    
 The third political economic contest is the financialization of forests. Since the 1980s, forest 
products companies in the United States began selling their land to financial actors (Stein 2012; Ginn 
2005; Bliss et al. 2010; Gunnoe and Gellert 2011). Post-sale, the new owners of private forests include: 
pension plans, Timber Investment Management Organizations (TIMOs), and Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) (Bliss et al. 2010). These new owners typically make returns on investment through a 
mixture of asset appreciation and timber operations (Zinkahn et al. 1992; Ravenel, Tyrrell, and 
Mendelsohn 2002). In order to maximize return on investment, financial owners make management 
decisions premised on market timing and economic optimization of outputs (Hagler 2006; Irland 2007; 
Weinberg and Larson 2008; Best and Wayburn 2001). Financial actors risk drastically changing the 
market interests and goals within working forests by focusing on short term profits over long term 
returns. The precise impact of this shift in management priorities is yet to be seen, but pressures to 
extract short-term value from forests has been shown to be damaging to ecosystems (Ravenel, Tyrrell, 
and Mendelsohn 2002; Gunnoe and Gellert 2011)    
 Fourth, scholars are increasingly recognizing that forests are controlled by a combination of 
state, market, and civil society actors (Agrawal and Gupta 2005; Wolf 2012). The forms of control that 
sometimes arise from these arrangements has been designated hybrid governance (Allaire and Wolf 
2004; Elsner 2004; Batterbury and Fernando 2006). The structure of these regimes varies, but it may be 
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assumed that the organizations form a network of relationships tied to the management of the forest. 
Underlying these governance arrangements is an institutional environment composed of rules, norms, 
values systems, and cultures (Elsner 2004; Wolf 2012; Levi-Faur 2012). Hybrid governance structures 
have the potential to blur and create new institutional logics (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Stark 1996; 
Allaire and Wolf 2004; Haveman and Rao 2006). These logics refer to belief systems and related 
practices that dominate a groups of organizations embedded in an institutional domain – state, market, 
or civil society (Scott 2001; Haveman and Rao 2006)1. Within hybrid governance arrangements, new or 
blurred institutional logics may arise. In the context of working forests, new or blurred logics may 
pertain to information sharing and multifunctionality. Within this setting, traditional interests and goals 
may be supplanted by new hybrid interests and goals. Despite these possible benefits in realizing 
multifunctionality, hybrid governance regimes create concerns about goal ambiguity and coherence 
(Kraatz and Block 2008; Allaire and Wolf 2004). 
Relations Among and Within Organizations 
 The working forests examined in this paper exhibit all four of the above characteristics. Many of 
the concerns that follow from parcelization, division of property rights, financialization, and hybrid 
governance within working forests arise from relations among organizations and between coalitions 
within organizations. These relationships in working forests may lead to contests among organizations. 
The interdependence between organizations is necessary for contests (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). 
Working forests create the interdependence necessary for either cooperation or contests.  
Working forests that arise from parcelization, the division of property rights, or both may  
exhibit contests among different rights holders (Beliveau 1992; Kazis and Grossman 1991; Vatn 2010; 
Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012). These contests arise out of differences in land use goals and 
                                                          
1
 In a governance context, I consider groups of organizations within an institutional domain as an organizational 
field because they share a similar institutional environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
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access (Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012; Ostrom 2003; Ribot and Peluso 2003). The risk of contests 
is frequently premised on assumptions that state, market, and civil society actors hold antithetical goals. 
These assumptions, however, are frequently over simplified (McCarthy 2005; Neugarten, Wolf, and 
Stedman 2012). In the context of working forests, the inclusion of goals mentioning a suite of economic, 
environmental and social goals by civil society and state actors has been shown to lessen perceived 
contests (Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012).  
Although the perceived inclusion of antithetical interests into organizational goals may lessen 
perceived contests, previous studies of working forests and multifunctionality have not adequately 
investigated potential contests within organizations. Previous organizational studies highlight the 
prevalence of contests among coalitions within organizations (Cyert and March 1963; Perrow 1961; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). The outcomes of these internal goal setting processes may have implications 
for interorganizational relations to the extent goals change.  
  Goals within organizations frequently conflict. Goals that are made public generally de-
emphasize conflicts in the goal setting process. Goals are the result of negotiations among various 
coalitions within an organization (Cyert and March 1963)2. Organizations only publicize a proportion of 
their goals, other goals are mentioned and acted on only by coalitions within the organization and may 
not manifest themselves in organizational practice (Perrow 1961; Thompson and McEwen 
1958).Organizations implement only a portion of coalitions’ goals due to power dynamics and budget 
constraints (Michels 1915; Cyert and March 1963; Coleman 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Contests 
may arise that are not evidenced in organizational practice or official goal statements. Moreover, the 
goal setting process within the organization frequently results from pressure outside of the organization 
                                                          
2
 Cyert and March (1963) see organizations as composed of coalitions or groups. Coalitions may be synonymous 
with organizational units, but need not be. Rather coalitions can extend beyond unit boundaries. I use the term 
coalitions to refer to groups within the organization that share a common goal, but need not be contained within a 
specific organizational unit. 
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(Thompson and McEwen 1958; J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Therefore, the 
various contests that may arise in the goal setting process result from both internal and external 
pressures. Working forests provide the environment in which internal and external pressures may lead 
to contests in the goal setting process.   
 Rather than assume that contests necessarily arise from organizations coming together with 
potentially antithetical goals, this paper exposes some of the most important organizational goals within 
working forests. Although this paper does not find manifest contests that question the viability of 
working forest, it does demonstrate the differences in goals within and among organizations that may 
give rise to contests. These possible contests, regardless of if they are realized, raise concerns about 
organizational legitimacy and the overall viability of working forests.       
Evaluating Working Forests 
Previous studies investigating contests between actors within working forests have largely 
focused on interpreting the outcomes of interviews and surveys targeted toward individual stakeholders 
(Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 2012; Block et al. 2004; Wolf and Klein 2007). These methods, although 
illustrative, do not usually explicitly study organizations. Organizations and their actions, however, are 
important because management and conservation decisions frequently are developed and implemented 
at the organizational level. Previous studies also deemphasize market actors (Neugarten, Wolf, and 
Stedman 2012). As discussed above, however, the modern political economic context of working forests 
involves financial organizations and for-profit timber companies. Therefore, it is necessary to include 
these actors in analysis. This paper remedies gaps in previous studies by developing an evaluative lens 
that allows analysts to determine the stated goals of all organizations. Once the goals are known, the 
analyst can begin to understand which goals might lead to contests.  
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The evaluative lens developed in this paper is premised on neo-institutional theory from 
sociology. Within neo-institutional theory, all organizations need to be legitimate: desirable, appropriate, 
and proper within the institutional contexts in which they operate (Weber 1968; Suchman 1995; Scott 
2001). Institutions are the values, norms, formal and informal rules, beliefs, and assumptions that 
permeate an organization’s work area (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Suchman 
1995; Scott 2001). Legitimating actors grant legitimacy to organizations premised on being in agreement 
with institutions (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997; 
Black 2008). Therefore, legitimacy is both institution and grantor specific. Without legitimacy, 
organizations cannot gain necessary resources and therefore expire. 
 There are three different types of legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and cultural-cognitive (Scott 
2001; Aldrich and Fiol 1994; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). An organization achieves pragmatic legitimacy 
when a legitimating actor perceives that the organization will advance their interests directly or 
indirectly through adherence to formal laws and rules. Organizations gain moral legitimacy when a 
legitimating actor perceives the ends and means of an organization are just or defensible. Lastly, 
organizations acquire cultural-cognitive legitimacy when a legitimating actor sees the organization as 
necessary or inevitable based on embedded assumptions or world views. Organizations do not build 
these types of legitimacy separately (Scott 2001). Rather an organization’s activities may build one, two, 
or three types of legitimacy. In an effort to build organizational resiliency, organizations strive to 
diversify their grants of legitimacy (Black 2008). Efforts to diversify legitimacy, however, may also 
diminish legitimacy if organizations must pursue non-complimentary goals or cannot adequately 
perform under multiple legitimating pressures (Meyer and Scott 1983; Kraatz and Block 2008; Azoulay, 
Repenning, and Zuckerman 2010).  
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While organizations seek to diversify and maintain their grants of legitimacy, legitimating actors 
constantly reevaluate previous grants of legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Kraatz and Block 2008; Black 2008). 
An important way that legitimating actors accomplish this goal is through accountability mechanisms 
(Jepson 2005; Black 2008). These mechanisms give actors (accountors) the ability to receive information 
and sanction other actors (accountees) (Bovens 2010; Bovens, Schillemans, and Hart 2008).  
Accountability mechanisms are composed of two parts: information flow and sanction. The flow 
of information may be either mandated by the accountor or voluntary given by the accountee. The 
content of the information may be either explicitly mandated or left to the discretion of the accountee. 
These flows of information are frequently institutionalized as part of so called “transparency 
mechanisms,” defined as mandated flows of information. As accountability mechanisms include a 
mandated flow of information, accountability mechanisms necessarily contain transparency 
mechanisms. Transparency mechanisms do not rise to the level of accountability until coupled with a 
sanction. The distinction is important as accountability provides the ability to shape regulated entities’ 
activities whereas transparency does not.  
Sanctions may be either direct or proximate. Direct sanctions are explicitly stated within the 
accountability mechanism and state the accountor and the repercussions of information disclosure. 
Proximate sanctions are implicit within accountability mechanisms and are created by relationships or 
laws other than the accountability mechanism. The nature of sanctions sometimes leads to confusion 
over the designation of transparency and accountability mechanisms. Specifically, some practitioners 
and scholars assume that proximate sanctions render some accountability mechanisms as transparency 
mechanisms. In this paper, I define accountability mechanisms to include either direct or proximate 
sanctions.  
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The precise and critical definition mentioned above is necessary as scholars and practitioners 
frequently loosely use the term accountability. The repercussions of this usage, however, shape 
discourses around environmental governance. Several scholars have studied accountability mechanisms 
within the context of governance. Most of these studies focus on the substantive or material nature of 
accountability, meaning they discuss the ability and willingness of accountors to sanction accountees as 
well as the integrity of information flows (for example see, Dunn and Legge 2001; Jepson 2005; Black 
2008; Murtaza 2012). Although this is clearly important for the proper functioning of accountability, it 
does not address the claims of some scholars that accountability may lead to legitimacy regardless of 
substance or materiality (Levi-Faur 2012). This paper does not investigate either the material or 
symbolic nature of accountability. Rather this paper focuses on the presence of an accountability 
mechanism regardless of the power of accountors or the integrity of information. As will be discussed 
later, however, it is assumed that the official goals spoken about in accountability mechanisms are 
purposively mentioned. Whether those goals are operationalized or true is not explored in this paper.  
Accountability mechanisms are necessary for continued grants of legitimacy from legitimating 
actors (Black 2008). These mechanisms allow an organization to both gain and maintain legitimacy by 
demonstrating agreement with the interests of the accountor through information flows. 
Simultaneously these mechanisms allow accountors to either continue to grant or diminish legitimacy 
through choosing to sanction. This dual nature of outcomes creates situates where organizations 
attempt to maximize information disclosures that would build legitimacy and minimize information 
disclosures that would diminish legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977).   
Bovens et al. (2010) develops a useful analytic to understanding accountability – the 
accountability environment, which is composed of the information exchange, power relationships, and 
sanctions between accountor and accountee. This environment demonstrates the content, structure, 
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and context of accountability mechanisms. Understanding the complete accountability environment 
requires the analyst to answer the following questions: 1) Who is the accountee? 2) Who is the 
accountor? 3) What is the mechanism through which they are accountable? 4) On what aspect of their 
conduct are they accountable; 5) What is the nature of the mechanism? And 6) What are the sanctions 
for breached standards (Mashaw 2006; Bovens, Schillemans, and Hart 2008; Bovens 2010)? The re-
creation of the accountability environment draws attention to the relationship between accountor and 
accountee, the mechanism that creates that relationship, the nature of the mechanism, the goals 
mentioned in the mechanisms, and the various repercussions of the failure to pursue or achieve goals. 
Investigating the conduct that accountees are accountable for provides the analyst the 
opportunity to understand the goals from which organizations seek to maintain legitimacy from key 
legitimating actors. If a goal is important to assure grants of legitimacy from a particular actor, it will be 
represented in the accountability mechanisms that link the organizations to the actor. Accountability 
mechanisms demonstrate the goals that are important to external actors – legitimating actors – as well 
as the goals that arise from internal processes. Not all goals, however, will be represented in 
accountability mechanisms. Rather only those necessary for legitimacy will be present. Within an 
interorganizational context, the accountability environment demonstrates the various goals that are 
important to organizations separately and jointly.  
The study of the accountability environment also elucidates important aspects of organizational 
legitimacy in complex environments. First, accountors have power over accountees. Previous studies 
have demonstrated that the number of external actors who have power over an organizations is 
negatively correlated with continued legitimacy (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Meyer and Scott 1983). 
Therefore, the accountability environment demonstrates the number of actors who have power over 
the organizations and their various demands of the organization. Second, the goals mentioned in 
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accountability mechanisms demonstrate the breadth of legitimating activities that organizations seek to 
embark on. Attempting to attain legitimacy from several legitimating actors by adhering to constraints 
and enabling mechanisms within institutions has been shown to lead to goal ambiguity, uncoordinated 
activities, and overall diminished legitimacy (Kraatz and Block 2008). Therefore, accountability 
environments and the content of accountability mechanisms demonstrates the diversity of goals that 
organizations attempt to gain legitimacy. Previous theory would predict that the greater the diversity of 
goals, the greater the risk of damage to existing legitimacy. 
Goals found in accountability mechanisms contextualized within the larger accountability 
environment offer evidence of possible contests among and within organizations. Different goals do not 
necessarily lead to contests. Rather goals that seem or in practice are antithetical to coalitions’ or 
organizations’ interests lead to contests (Perrow 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Neugarten, Wolf, and 
Stedman 2012). Contests are important to understanding the viability of working forests because 
contests may damage legitimacy. One important way this damage may occur is when legitimating actors 
(i.e. accountors) discover organizational failures that arise from contests and choose to sanction the 
organization. Moreover, contests between accountor and accountee organizations may damage 
legitimacy.  
In an attempt to understand organizational relations and goals in working forests, I reconstruct 
the accountability environment for two working forests. This allows me to understand the relationships 
and processes through which organizations attempt to gain and maintain legitimacy within working 
forests. I then perform a content analysis on accountability mechanisms to identify organizational goals. 
A combined analysis of the accountability environment and goals in accountability mechanisms allows 
me the opportunity to understand the complexity demonstrated by the four characteristics of modern 
working forests and the risks of possible contests within and among organizations in the working forest. 
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Specifically, I seek to address two questions: 1) what evidence does the accountability environment 
provide for concerns arising out of parcelization, division of property rights, financialization, and hybrid 
governance in working forests; and 2) what evidence does the accountability environment provide 
about contests among and within organizations? 
Methods 
Case Study Methods and Selection 
I chose two working forests cases that exemplify characteristics of the modern political 
economic context discussed above. Forests that have these characteristics are prone to contests 
between actors, goal ambiguity, inefficiencies, and detrimental forest outcomes. Cases were not 
compared to support a hypothesis or finding (Ragin 1989; Ragin and Becker 1992). Rather the cases are 
used to demonstrate the breadth of goals espoused by organizations and the complexity of 
accountability structures in working forests. In this effort, some comparisons are made across cases. As I 
am not testing a hypothesis, I chose two relatively similar working forests. Due to this methodology, the 
findings of this case analysis only hold for the cases studied. The types of dynamics found between 
organizations may, however, be indicative of similar relationships in other working forests. Moreover, 
the study of accountability mechanisms and environment may be used in other studies of environmental 
governance.  
To find cases that exemplified parcelization, division of property rights, financialization, and 
hybrid governance, I searched news articles over the past forty years. I used Factiva to find news articles. 
Factiva is a Dow Jones database composed of thousands of newspapers, blogs, TV and radio transcripts, 
newswires, press releases, consumer magazines, and twitter feeds from over 200 countries.  
The search I composed in Factiva was: forest and ("United States" or US) and sale and 
("International Paper" or "Georgia Pacific" or Weyerhaeuser or "St. Regis" or Champion or “Finch Pruyn” 
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or Pingree) and ("The Nature Conservancy" or "Trust for Public Land" or Trust or “Land Trust”) and 
easement  and ("Plum Creek" or "Forestland Group" or "Hancock Timber" or "Campbell Group" or Lyme 
or “Regions Timberland” or "Wagner Forest"). 
I used the first three search terms to find articles that mentioned the sale of forest land in the 
United States. The set of organizations in the first set of parenthesis are seven of the top twenty largest 
forest products companies in the United States as designated by Bloomberg.com. By entering these 
organizations into the search, I was able constrain my results to transactions that likely involved sales of 
large parcels of land that might be subject to parcelization. The next two groupings of search terms 
ensured the involvement of land trusts and easements. These terms were introduced to increase the 
probability of finding cases that exhibited division of property rights and hybrid governance 
arrangements. Finally, to assure the involvement of financial organizations, I entered the search terms in 
the last set of parentheses. These organizations are major Timber Investment Management 
Organizations or Real Estate Investment Trusts in the United States. This search yielded seven land 
transactions that had a high probability of exemplifying the preferred characteristics. These transactions 
are described in Table 1.   
Table 1: Working Forest Land Deals between Involving TIMOs and Land Trusts 1980-2012 
Year Seller Original 
Purchaser 
States Land Size 
(Acres) 
Market Actors State 
Actors 
Civil Society 
Actors 
1998 Champion 
International 
The 
Conservation 
Fund 
NY, 
VT, NH 
296,000 Champion 
international, 
Essex Timber 
Company 
USFWS, 
State 
Government, 
State 
Agency,  
The Conservation 
Fund, Heartland 
Forest Fund, The 
Nature 
Conservancy, 
Recreational Clubs 
2001 International 
Paper 
The Trust for 
Public Land 
NH 171,000 International 
Paper, Lyme 
Timber Co  
State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
The Nature 
Conservancy, The 
Trust for Public 
Lands, The Society 
for the Protection 
of NH Forests 
2001 Pingree New England 
Forestry 
Foundation 
ME 762,192 Hancock State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
New England 
Forestry 
Foundation, 
Pingree Forest 
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Year Seller Original 
Purchaser 
States Land Size 
(Acres) 
Market Actors State 
Actors 
Civil Society 
Actors 
Partnership, 
Recreational Clubs 
2003 Weyerhaeuser Evergreen 
Forest Trust 
WA 104,000 Weyerhaeuser, 
Hancock 
USFS, State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
Evergreen Forest 
Trust, Cascade 
Land Conservancy, 
Local Towns 
2004 International 
Paper 
New York 
State 
NY 257,425 International 
Paper 
State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
The Conservation 
Fund, Recreational 
Clubs 
2006 International 
Paper 
The Nature 
Conservancy, 
The 
Conservation 
Fund 
NC, 
VA, 
GA, FL, 
AL, AK, 
TN, 
LA, SC, 
MS 
218,000 International 
Paper, 
Conservation 
Forestry LLC, 
Forest 
investment 
Associates, 
Resource 
Management 
Service LLC 
State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
The Nature 
Conservancy, the 
Conservation 
Fund, Recreational 
Clubs 
2007 Finch Pruyn The Nature 
Conservancy 
NY 166,000 Atlas, Blue Wolf, 
Regions, Finch 
Pruyn Holdings, 
John Hancock 
State 
Government, 
State 
Agencies 
The Nature 
Conservancy, 
Recreational 
Organizations 
    
I reviewed all seven cases to determine if they exemplified the characteristics I wanted. Five 
cases exemplified all four characteristics. For reasons of tractability, I kept only cases that were in the 
Northern Forest. Two cases resulted. One case is in New Hampshire that involves a transaction between 
International Paper and The Trust for Public Land. The other case is in New York that involves a 
transaction between Finch Pruyn and The Nature Conservancy. A brief history of each case is presented 
below.  
New Hampshire – Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case  
In July 2001, International Paper, a multinational forest products company, announced that it 
would sell 171,000 acres of its land in northern New Hampshire (Frothingham 2001). The land was 
known as the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters. To explore the various possibilities for disposition of this 
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land, Senator Judd Gregg (R) created the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Partnership Task Force 
(Frothingham 2001). Judd mandated that the Task Force assess opinion and work “to develop a locally 
driven conservation strategy that preserves multiple uses of the land and its economic and recreational 
value to the region.”3  
In April 2002, the Task Force released its proposal that ensured forestry and recreational access, 
while permanently protecting key forest and natural areas. The proposal sold all the land to the Trust for 
Public Land for $32.7 million. It was explicit in this grant that the Trust for Public Land would subdivide 
the land, selling 25,000 acres of the land to The Nature Conservancy and selling 146,500 acres to Lyme 
Timber Company (Associated Press 2001). To facilitate this transaction, the Task Force also created the 
Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Trust, which took ownership of the 146,500 acres promised to Lyme until 
the deal could be completed. Moreover, The Trust for Public Land would sell a conservation easement 
on all the property to the NH State Government. In this proposal, The Nature Conservancy stated that 
they would sell all of their land holdings to the state of New Hampshire (ASCRIBE 2001).  
Before the state of New Hampshire purchased the land from The Nature Conservancy in 2002, 
both the Resources Recreation and Development Committee and the Land Management Advisory 
Committee within the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services solicited comments from 
the public. After receiving comments, the state purchased The Nature Conservancy Land. The state 
delegated management of the land to the Fish and Game Department, with the Conservancy continuing 
to hold a conservation easement on the land (Love 2002). Beyond the conservation easement, the land 
was also subject to a recreation and road maintenance plan managed by the Department of Resources 
and Economic Development’s (DRED) Division of Parks and Recreation, and a firewood supply 
agreement held by Connecticut Lakes Timber Company.  
                                                          
3
 http://www.nhdfl.org/about-forests-and-lands/boards-commissions-committees/connecticut.aspx  
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In October of 2003, Lyme Timber Company finalized their purchase of the land from the Trust 
for Public Lands. Moreover, in this year, DRED’s Division of Forests and Land purchased the conservation 
easement on the Lyme land (PR Newswires 2003). The easement prohibited development, guaranteed 
public access, and ensured sustainable forestry.  
In 2009, Lyme Timber Group sold its interest in the land to Heartland Forestland Fund VI – a 
timberland investment fund managed by the Forestland Group. The Forestland Group hired LandVest, a 
forestland manager and consultant to conduct the day to day management of the Connecticut Lakes 
Headwaters Forest.  
Table 2: Land Holdings for the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case as of June 2013 
 Tract/ Parcel 
1 
(Working Forest Conservation Easement) 
146,500 acres 
2 
(Public Lands) 
25,000 acres 
Property 
Rights 
Own The Forestland Group/ Heartland Forest Fund 
VI 
NH State 
Manage 
LandVest 
Fish and Game Department, 
DRED (Division of Parks and 
Recreation) 
Access 
LandVest, DRED (Division of Forests and Land) 
Hunting Clubs, Connecticut 
Lakes Timber Company 
Develop DRED (Division of Forests and Land) The Nature Conservancy 
New York – Finch Pruyn Case  
In early 2007, Finch Pruyn Paper sold 166,000 acres in the Adirondack region to Atlas Holdings 
LLC and Blue Wolf Capital (Rulison 2007). Between April and June of 2007, Atlas and Blue Wolf held a 
bidding process for the land. In June, it was announced that the land would be sold to The Nature 
Conservancy for $110 million.  
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The initial agreement between The Nature Conservancy and Atlas specified that Atlas would 
have a 20 year right to first refusal on stumpage on the land (LeBrun 2007). It also specified that Blue 
Wolf would retain control of the Finch Pruyn mill operating on the land. Finally, the agreement specified 
that The Nature Conservancy would pay the local taxes on the land (totaling 1.1 million dollars in 2007).  
In 2008, the state agreed to buy 57,699 acres of timberland, as well as purchase conservation 
easements on 73,627 acres of land using the money from the state’s Environmental Protection Fund. 
This deal implicated local towns who had veto power over this transaction under New York state law. 
According to the press, they did not exercise this right (DePalma 2008; Neugarten, Wolf, and Stedman 
2012). The state specified that 1,908 acres of the land bought would be used for a variety of community 
uses, such as public recreation and community housing (Virtanen 2008). 
Also in 2008, The Nature Conservancy consulted with local hunting and recreational clubs. The 
Nature Conservancy leased 40,000 acres to 11 clubs who had licenses where the state intended to buy 
easements. It further leased land to 20 other clubs who had lands that would be converted to forest 
preserve, with an understanding of a 10 year transition period (DePalma 2008). 
In 2009, The Nature Conservancy announced that it would sell 93,000 acres to ATP, a Danish 
Pension Fund, subject to the following deed restrictions. This agreement specified “1) that an agreement 
to place critical riparian zones and high elevation lands into a Conservation Easement was to be 
established, 2) that a Fiber Supply Agreement with Finch Paper, LLC be executed, and 3) that operation 
of these timberlands would be under third-party verified Sustainable Forest Management Systems.”4 
ATP hired Regions Timberland, a TIMO, to manage the forest production (Virtanen 2009). 
                                                          
4
 Regions Timberland management plan: 
http://www.regionstimberland.com/pdfs/RMK_Management_Plan_Upper_Hudson.pdf  
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In 2010, the state purchased the conservation easement on 73,000 acres of the ATP land, 
leaving 20,000 acres without protection. The state’s payment was criticized for being more than the fair 
value of the land (Dicker 2010).  In 2012, two final purchases occurred. The town of Newcomb 
purchased 348 acres from The Nature Conservancy. In the final transaction,  the New York State 
Government bought the remaining 69,000 acres from TNC (Navarro 2012). 
Table 3: Land Holdings for the Finch Pruyn Case as of June 2013     
 Tract/ Parcel 
1 
(WFCE) 
73,000 acres 
2 
(Public Lands) 
69,000 acres 
3 
(Community 
Lands) 
348 acres 
4  
(Private Lands) 
20,000 acres 
Property 
Rights 
Own 
ATP NY State Newcomb ATP 
Manage 
Regions Timberland NY State Newcomb ATP 
Access 
Hunting Clubs 
Hunting Clubs, Public, 
NY State 
Newcomb ATP 
Develop NY State, Atlas, FP 
Holdings, Blue Wolf 
NY State Newcomb ATP 
      
Constructing and Analyzing the Accountability Environment 
 The main analytical framework from which to view accountability is through the accountability 
environment. I constructed the accountability environment for each actor who held property rights in 
these working forests as of June 2013. I then transformed the information on the accountability 
environment into visual representations demonstrating the structure of accountability relationships. In 
constructing the accountability environment, three methodological issues had to be resolved: 1) which 
accountability mechanisms to include; 2) how to talk about accountability processes across actors; and 3) 
how to categorize the nature of accountability. 
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Generally there are two types of accountability mechanisms: formal and informal (Unerman and 
O’Dwyer 2006; Romzek, Blackmar, and Leroux 2012). I used formal accountability mechanisms to 
construct the accountability environment. Formal accountability mechanisms are created by contractual 
relationships or relationships that are institutionalized in laws or other norms (Unerman and O’Dwyer 
2006; Romzek, Blackmar , and Leroux 2012). These formal types of accountability mechanisms use terms, 
language, performance measures, and reporting to build relationships (Romzek, Blackmar, and Leroux 
2012). I found formal accountability mechanisms in a variety of documents including: annual reports, 
donor reports, contracts, easements, deeds, and laws. To find these documents, I used Factiva, Google 
news searches, and Westlaw (a legal database). I also found documents through reviewing 
organizational and government websites. 
 I did address informal accountability mechanisms in this study. Informal accountability 
mechanisms are not formalized. Rather they rely on social relations, values, and norms. Arguably, the 
most cited form of informal accountability is reputation. I chose not to use informal accountability 
mechanisms to construct the accountability environment because the specification of an accountor 
relies heavily on the judgment of the analyst because there is rarely an accountor explicitly mentioned. 
Accountability mechanisms either explicitly or implicitly empower the accountor to sanction the 
accountee. This empowerment would be difficult to specify in informal mechanisms. Although the 
inclusion of informal accountability mechanisms could lead to more robust findings, I chose not to 
include them because of the specification errors that may arise. 
 Scholars generally discuss accountability mechanisms within different institutional domains and 
political contexts. This poses a problem when analyzing accountability mechanisms across institutional 
domains because there is no common language to discuss accountability mechanisms. Instead of 
developing yet another categorization of mechanisms, I chose previous categorizations that 
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encompassed the diversity of mechanisms presented in the two cases. Furthermore, different 
categorizations are warranted as accountability relationships are shaped by institutional pressures. I 
make my categorization explicit as to avoid confusion. The categorization allows me the ability to discuss 
similar mechanisms across cases.  
Government accountability is the obligation owed by all public officials to the public for 
explanation and justification premised on their use of public office and the delegated powers conferred 
on the government (Burke 1988; Mulgan 2000; Dunn and Legge 2001). Mulgan (2000) divides 
accountability mechanisms into two forms: internal and external. Internal mechanisms control the 
government from within and include separation of powers, federalism, judicial review, and rule of law. 
External mechanisms are those imposed by outside actors or documents and include constitutional 
constraints and legal regulations that require exact purposes or certain procedures. I discuss categories 
and their descriptions in Table 4. In the cases presented in this paper, most of the mechanisms that I 
categorized as one of the first seven categories were laws and regulations, like state and federal 
constitution, administrative procedure laws, and agency regulations. Moreover, I categorized 
conservation easements as Contracts and websites as Information Disclosures.  
Table 4: Categories for State Democratic Accountability 
Name (Abbrev.) Description 
Separation of Powers (SOP) A constitutional based constraint that relies on the different checks and balances 
put in place between government actors. 
Federalism (FED) A constitutional constraint but relies on the delegated powers of federal, state, and 
local actors. 
Judicial Review (JR) Relies on courts to review decisions of either agencies or legislatures. 
Rule of Law (ROL) Synonymous with laws and regulations that do not pertain to administrative or 
constitutional law. 
Constitutional Law (ConL) Legal mechanisms that are premised on the national or state constitution.  
Administrative Law (AdmL) Legal mechanisms pertaining to bureaucratic structure and rulemaking 
Budgetary Process (BUD) Mechanisms of controlling budget, usually premised on separation of powers. 
Contracts (K) Legal mechanisms relying on joint assent 
Information Disclosures (InfoDis) Disclosures of information 
Elections (ELEC) Mechanisms premised on public control of elected officials within a democratic 
process, usually held within constitutional law. 
Professional Rules (PROF) Mechanisms that speak to professional guidelines, rules, and certification  
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Market organization accountability is primarily spoken about in terms of corporate 
accountability (Nader 1978). Scholars of corporate accountability generally focus on managerial 
monitoring, disclosure to shareholders, and legal requirements (Fligstein 1993; Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Corporate accountability in the United States is further complicated by the division of property 
rights and power dynamics between managers and owners of corporations (Berle and Means 1933). 
Scholars have designate five main categories of corporate accountability: disclosures, performance 
assessments, legal or exchange requirements, contracts or other formal agreements, and external 
certification (Nader 1978; Hamilton 2005; Ebrahim 2003). I discuss these categories and their 
descriptions in Table 5. In the cases in this paper, I categorized annual reports and websites as 
Disclosure Statements, financial statements as Performance Assessments, legal mandates as Legal or 
Exchange Requirements, conservation easements as Contracts or Other Formal Agreements, and forest 
stewardship council and other certifications as External Certifications. 
Table 5: Categories for Corporate Actor Accountability Processes  
Name (Abbrev.) Description 
Disclosure Statements (DIS) Disclosures of finances or organizational structure.  Information disclosures on 
websites. Annual reports.  
Performance Assessments  (PERF) Internal and external project and organizational assessments and evaluation. 
Includes external auditor reports. 
Legal or Exchange Requirements (LegEx) Legal requirements for operation or requirements for inclusion in a formalized 
market exchange. 
Contract or Other Formal Agreement 
(KFA) 
Legal or non-legal agreements premised on mutual assent. 
 
External Certification (CERT) Mechanisms where information is disclosed to a third party in an effort to gain 
some sort of certification. 
 
Two important actors exist in the civil society institutional domain: communities and non-
government organizations (NGOs). The most frequently cited form of accountability within communities 
is reputation (Ostrom 1990). As reputation is an informal accountability mechanism, it falls outside of 
this analysis. To the extent that communities are subject to formal accountability mechanisms, their 
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accountability relationships are better categorized using the categories discussed for government 
accountability.   
Generally NGO accountability mechanisms are discussed in terms of tools and processes 
(Ebrahim 2003). Tools are reports, disclosure statements, and performance assessments. Processes are 
participation, self regulation, and social audits. These categories expand NGO accountability beyond 
boards and managers to include the stakeholders that NGOs assist (Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006; 
Murtaza 2012). NGOs need a different categorization of accountability from corporate accountability 
because corporate accountability’s focus on shareholders distorts some forms of NGO accountability 
(Ebrahim 2003; Unerman and O’Dwyer 2006; Murtaza 2012). Specifically the application of corporate 
accountability on NGOs emphasizes boards, activists, managers, and directors, rather than those to 
whom they provide services. Table 6 describes these categories. In the cases discussed in this paper, I 
categorized generally annual reports and IRS 990 forms as Reports and Disclosure Statements, financial 
reports as Performance Assessments and Evaluations, and external certifications as Self Regulation.  
Table 6: Categories of NGO Accountability Processes 
Name (Abbrev.) Description 
Reports and Disclosure Statements (RDS) Disclosures of finances, organizational structure, or IRS status. Information 
disclosures on websites. Annual reports  
Performance Assessments and 
Evaluations (PerEv) 
Internal and external project and organizational assessments and evaluation. 
Includes external auditor reports. 
Participation (PART) Formal consultation with outside stakeholders requiring the dissemination of 
information from the NGO. 
Self Regulation (SR) Mechanisms where the accountor is another NGO or network of NGOs that 
have developed standards, metrics, or codes of behavior. These sometimes 
result in certification. 
Social Audits (SA) Formal processes involving stakeholder dialogue through which an 
organization assesses, reports, and improves its ethical and social 
performance.  
 
Finally, as recommended by Bovens (2010) and Murtaza (2012), I document the nature of 
accountability mechanisms. The nature of accountability mechanisms can either be voluntary or 
mandatory (Bovens 2010). I use the voluntary designation to signify accountability mechanisms where 
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there is no formal requirement to disclose the information or to be sanctioned by an accountor. An 
example is an annual report created by a non-profit. I categorize mechanisms as mandatory when there 
is a formal requirement to disclose information or be sanctioned by an accountor. An example is the 
Internal Revenue Service regulation requiring non-profits to submit a 990 Form disclosing their sources 
of funding. I categorized mechanisms that were part of voluntary entered into agreements, like 
contracts, as mandatory. The mandatory nature arises from the legal nature of the agreement once it is 
entered into.  
In review, I used formal accountability mechanisms to construct the accountability environment. 
I categorized these mechanisms based on previous accountability studies. These categories are 
institutional domain specific. I also categorized each mechanism by its mandatory or voluntary nature.      
The Content of Accountability Mechanisms 
Once I found the accountability mechanisms and constructed the accountability environment, I 
investigated the goals present in the mechanisms. To accomplish this task, I used qualitative content 
analysis (Mayring 2000; Krippendorff 2012). The content of accountability mechanisms speaks to goals 
that the accountor sees as important for continued grants of legitimacy to the accountee. Content 
analysis broadly investigates the content or contextual meaning of text and language. Hsieh and 
Shannon (2005) define qualitative content analysis as the “subjective interpretation of the content of 
text data through the systematic classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns.” 
Qualitative content analysis retains the rigor of quantitative content analysis, but does not rely on 
converting qualitative data into matrices to be used in regression type approaches (Cavanagh 1997; 
Mayring 2000; Hsieh and Shannon 2005). In this study, I use qualitative rather than quantitative content 
analysis because it is not necessary to make word counts in order to understand which goals are 
transmitted to accountors. To complete the qualitative content analysis, I had to determine: 1) What is a 
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goal? 2) Which goals was I analyzing? 3) Where do I find goals in accountability mechanisms? and 4) 
How would I categorize and discuss these goals?  
First, I determined the definition of goal I was going to use. A goal is simply an end that the 
organization or parts of the organizations attempt to achieve (see, Merriam-Webster 2003). For this 
content analysis, I documented any ends that were mentioned in accountability mechanisms. In some 
cases, organizations explicitly used goal language.  While in other cases, I had to infer the organization 
was attempting to reach a specific end. I extracted all the text surrounding the goal because of this 
heterogeneity.  
Second, I had to determine what types of goals I was analyzing. The study of goals is quite 
common in organizational studies. Parsons (1956) argued that organizations are different than other 
collections of individuals because organizations have a purpose or goal. Perrow (1961) distinguishes 
between two types of goals: goals represented in official communications and goals arising from daily 
decisions of personnel. He argues that research on both types of goals is necessary to understand 
organizations. Organizations act and disclose goals that result from negotiation and contestation among 
coalitions within an organization (Michels 1915; Thompson and McEwen 1958; Cyert and March 1963; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
In this study, formal accountability mechanisms mention only official goals. These official goals, 
however, are the outcome of internal daily decisions and negotiations (Thompson and McEwen 1958). 
Therefore, the official goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms are indicative of processes in time. 
The goals in accountability mechanisms also demonstrate legitimating processes in time. As stated 
above, I am only looking at working forests at a particular time. The heterogeneity of goals over time is 
not analyzed because of the frequent changes in ownership of land and property rights in these cases. 
Future work, however, can explore goal setting in working forests as processes in time.   
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 Third, I determined where I would search for goals within accountability mechanisms. Goals are 
found in different places depending on the accountability mechanism. For instance, within a 
conservation easement between the Nature Conservancy and the State of New Hampshire, the goals are 
found in the contractual language regarding expectations, monitoring, and disclosure. In annual reports, 
organizations mention goals throughout the report, but particularly in recounting previous performance. 
For instance, The Nature Conservancy’s annual reports mention goals in sections discussing overarching 
mission and new land acquisitions. As content is found within different places for each accountability 
mechanism, I developed a guide to where I found goals within each category of accountability 
mechanisms. This guide is presented in Table 7.  
Table 7: Where Goal Content Was Found By Category 
Type Category Where Content Was Found 
Government 
Separation of 
Powers (SOP) 
Constitution – Sections regarding links between branches within a certain level of 
government 
Federalism (FED) Constitution – Sections regarding relationship between federal and state government 
Judicial Review 
(JR) 
Constitution and Laws – Sections regarding who adjudicates interpretations of laws 
and regulations  
Rule of Law (ROL) Constitution and Laws – Sections regarding who adjudicates disputes over law 
Constitutional 
Law (ConL) 
Constitution – Sections regarding elections and appointments   
Administrative 
Law (AdmL) 
Laws – Sections regarding the regulatory process  
Budgetary 
Process (BUD) 
Constitution and Laws -  Sections regarding decisions about appropriations 
Contracts (K) Contracts – Sections speaking to expectations under the contract, monitoring, and 
enforcement 
Information 
Disclosures 
(InfoDis) 
Websites, Press Releases, and Annual Reports – The document itself 
Elections (ELEC) Constitutions – Sections regarding elections 
Professional Rules 
(PROF) 
Websites, Laws, By-Laws – Sections regarding expectations and requirements for 
professional certifications  
Corporation 
Disclosure 
Statements (DIS) 
Annual Reports, Social Responsibility Reports – The document itself  
Performance 
Assessments  
(PERF) 
Financial Reports, Auditor Reports -  The document itself 
Legal or exchange 
requirements 
(LegEx) 
Stock Exchange Rules, Laws – Sections regarding information disclosure and sanctions 
Contract or Other 
Formal 
Agreement (KFA) 
Contracts – Sections speaking to expectations under the contract, monitoring, and 
enforcement  
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Type Category Where Content Was Found 
External 
Certification 
(CERT) 
External Certification Guidelines – Sections regarding expectations and requirements 
for certification, monitoring, and enforcement 
NGO 
Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements (RDS) 
Annual Reports, Donor Reports – The document itself 
Performance 
Assessments and 
Evaluations 
(PerEv) 
Project Assessments, Reports – The document itself 
Participation 
(PART) 
News Media, Participation Summaries – The document itself 
Self Regulation 
(SR) 
External Certification guidelines – Sections regarding expectation and requirements 
for certification, monitoring, and enforcement 
Social Audits (SA) Project Assessments – The document itself  
 
Fourth, once I found formal goals in accountability mechanisms using the guide above, I 
documented the goals (See Appendix 1 and 2). For tractability, I then placed these goals into 
environmental, economic, and social categories. I categorized the goals as follows: language pertaining 
to conservation, ecology, sustainability, and environmental certification was categorized as 
environmental; language pertaining to return on investment, finance, efficiency, profits, harvest, and 
fundraising was coded as economic; and language pertaining to education, recreation, inclusion, 
engagement, and inequality was categorized as social. I will discuss this categorization process through 
an example found in the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case. In this example, Landvest is accountable 
to shareholders and the public through a website disclosure that states:  
1) “Financial analysis of stands, forests and timberland investments is a core discipline at 
LandVest. We apply discounted cash flow analysis to solve for optimal solutions, 
have dedicated in-house programs, and a MS Forest Economist on staff” 
2) “Our staff has expertise in Woodstock, USFS Twigs FVS and Flex Fiber modeling 
programs. Our in-house program (SIMULATE II) estimates Internal Rate of Return 
from stand- type characteristics and optimization treatments” 
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3) “LandVest plans use stand type level growth and yield modeling with associated 
financial analysis to achieve property owner objectives. Plans are capable of meeting 
state tax programs and FSC/SFI certification programs as well” 
The bolded wording represents goal language. The goals stated in excerpts one and two relate to 
economic goals because they speak to rate of return and cash flow analyses of forest harvests. These 
were coded as economic goals. In excerpt three, the goals related to Forest Stewardship Council and the 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative certifications were coded as environmental. In aggregate, I coded this 
accountability mechanism as having both economic and environmental goals. Once I coded goals, I 
amalgamated accountability mechanisms by accountee and category of mechanism. The outcomes of 
this process are found in Table 8 and 9 below.   
Findings  
 Findings of both the reconstruction of the accountability environment and the content analysis 
are presented by case. Once again, these findings are indicative of the interorganizational arrangement 
and the working forests as of June 2013. My discussion of findings focuses on relationships between 
accountors and accountees, the categories of mechanisms, the nature of the mechanisms, and the goals 
reported in them.  
The answers to the six questions that are necessary to construct the accountability environment 
and the goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms is presented in Appendix 1 and 2. I used this 
information to create a simplified version of the accountability environment, including a statement of 
goals in accountability mechanisms. Goals are simplified into a few key words and then sorted into 
environmental, economic, and social categories. This information is presented in Tables 8 and 9. I used 
the information on relationships between accountor and accountee, and the information on the 
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categories of accountability mechanisms to create a visual representation of the accountability 
environment. This information is presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case 
  
From Table 8 and Figure 1, one sees that The Nature Conservancy is accountable primarily to 
donors, the public, the federal government, and other NGOs. The accountability mechanisms that create 
these relationships mention sustainability goals that incorporate economic actors and some types of 
timber harvest. The Nature Conservancy is subject to voluntary third party certification by several other 
non-profit organizations. The content of these mechanisms mentions goals of transparency and 
efficiency. The only mandatory mechanisms are IRS 990 Forms, which are required to be completed by 
all non-profits to maintain their tax exempt status. The Nature Conservancy’s 990 Forms mention 
fundraising activities and land acquisitions.    
 The Forestland Group and LandVest’s voluntary disclosures predominantly focus on maximizing 
returns on investment. The Forestland Group does not specify conservation goals in its websites or press 
releases. The organization is expected to achieve goals regarding conservation and recreation as 
evidenced in the conservation easement. Beyond investment maximization, Landvest mentions goals 
regarding conservation and recreation in websites and press releases.   
 Finally, there is an intricate accountability network between government agencies, the 
legislature, the executive branch, and the electorate. Administrative and constitutional law, and the 
separation of powers are the most prevalent accountability mechanisms. These mechanisms form the 
basis of elected official and electorate oversight. Each division within the Department of Resources and 
Economic Development has a unique focus or goal with some overlap pertaining to recreation. The 
Division of Forest and Parks is expected to pursue goals of conservation, recreation, and efficiency. The 
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Division of Parks and Recreation has a strong emphasis on recreation and local economic development, 
with only minimal mentions of conservation. 
 The visual representation of the accountability structure presented in Figure 1 demonstrates 
that most accountability mechanisms create relationships within institutional domains. The two notable 
exceptions in this case are the conservation easement, the contract for management, and the IRS 990 
Form. Moreover, the visual representation demonstrates that organizations in the state institutional 
domain have a dense network of accountability mechanisms. 
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Table 8: Construction of Accountability Environment with Goals Mentioned in Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case 
Domain Accountability Environment Goal Summary 
Domain Accountee Accountors Mechanisms Examples Nature Environmental Economic Social 
State 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information 
Disclosure 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, Maps, 
Forest Health 
Newsletters 
Mandatory, 
Voluntary 
● 
 
● 
NH Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Administrative Law, 
Rule of Law 
Bureaucracy Mandatory 
 
● 
 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process, Title 
XIX-A Forestry 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Division of 
Parks and 
Recreation 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information 
Disclosure 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Recreation Plan, Road 
Access Plan 
Mandatory 
● 
 
● 
NH Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Administrative Law, 
Rule of Law 
Bureaucracy Mandatory 
 
● ● 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process 
Mandatory 
 
● ● 
NH 
Department 
of Resources 
and 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information 
Disclosure 
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 
 
● ● 
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Domain Accountability Environment Goal Summary 
Domain Accountee Accountors Mechanisms Examples Nature Environmental Economic Social 
Economic 
Development 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process, Title 
XII-A-1c 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
NH Fish and 
Game 
Department 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information 
Disclosure 
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 
● 
 
● 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process 
Mandatory 
 
● 
 
Market 
The 
Forestland 
Group 
Investors/Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website, Press Release Voluntary 
 
● 
 
NH Division of 
Forest and Land 
Contracts and Other 
Formal Agreements 
Conservation Easement Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Connecticut Lakes 
Timber Company 
Contracts and Other 
Formal Agreements 
Contract Mandatory 
 
● ● 
LandVest  
Investors/Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 
● ● ● 
The Forestland 
Group 
Contracts and Other 
Formal Agreements 
Contract Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Connecticut 
Lakes Timber 
Company 
Shareholders/Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 
 
● 
 
Civil 
Society 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Donors/Public Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements, 
Performance 
Assessments and 
Evaluations 
Annual Reports, Donor 
Reports, Financial 
Statements, Websites, 
Press Releases 
Voluntary 
● ● ● 
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Domain Accountability Environment Goal Summary 
Domain Accountee Accountors Mechanisms Examples Nature Environmental Economic Social 
Federal 
Government 
Performance 
Assessments and 
Evaluations 
IRS 990 Forms Mandatory   
● 
 
Other NGOs Self-Regulation Third Party Certification Voluntary   ● ● 
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Figure 1: Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case – Structure of Accountability 
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Finch Pruyn Case 
From reviewing Table 9, it is clear that local hunting lodges and recreational clubs are important 
civil society actors. By-laws and membership agreements mention goals pertaining to recreation, fees, 
and hunting – demonstrating a focus on economic and social goals. Some language around recreational 
hunting may be construed to incorporate environmental goals as they do speak about enjoying the 
outdoors and making sure it is accessible to future generations of hunters. The by-laws, membership 
agreements, and websites are voluntary. The clubs are mandatorily accountable to the state and federal 
government through legal processes for violations of land use, hunting, and conservation statutes. 
There are four market actors in this case: ATP, Regions Timberland, Atlas, and Blue Wolf. 
Through many voluntary reports and disclosure, ATP and Regions Timberland are accountable to 
investors, shareholders, and the public. The disclosure statements mention goals of improving 
investment performance and environmental stewardship. Regions Timberland is accountable to ATP 
through a contract for management. The goals mentioned in this contract mandate that Regions 
Timberland preserves the ecology of the forest, maintains silviculture practice, maintain recreational 
access, and maximizes annual cut to improve investor performance. Regions Timberland is accountable 
to Forest Stewardship Council. Through this mechanism, Regions Timberland purports to pursue goals 
that speak to forest sustainability broadly.  
Similar to ATP and Regions Timberland, Blue Wolf’s and Atlas’ main accountability mechanisms 
are voluntary disclosures. The contents of these disclosures mention economic investment, building 
efficient companies and portfolios, and social responsibility. Social responsibility is discussed broadly 
and tangentially mentions environmental impact. Each organization had a press release regarding The 
Nature Conservancy deal on their website. Atlas is also subject to the conservation easement. Goals 
within the easement pertain to preserving the ecology of the forest, maintaining silviculture practice, 
51 
 
maintaining recreational access, honoring a fiber supply agreement, and maximizing annual cut to 
improve investor performance. 
The most prevalent accountability mechanisms for state actors are separation of powers, 
judicial review, constitutional and administrative law, budget, federalism, rule of law, and information 
disclosures. All of these mechanisms except for some information disclosures are mandatory. Like the 
agencies in the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters case, each government agency who holds property rights 
has similar yet differentiated objectives. The Adirondack Park Agency and the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation are accountable to the public, elected officials, and the 
courts through a combination of administrative and constitutional law, separation of powers, budgets, 
and appointments. The goals mentioned in these mechanisms pertain to the environmental stewardship, 
economic growth, management of wildlands, and recreational access. Through being subject to the 
State Administrative Procedure Act, agencies have goals of participation in creating regulations under 
notice and comment procedures. Finally the Town of Newcomb is accountable to the state government 
and its agencies and the public. These mechanisms are largely voluntary. Goals mentioned in the 
accountability mechanisms speak to efficiency, conservation, and local service provision. 
The visual representation of the accountability environment in Figure 2 demonstrates that most 
accountability mechanisms and the relationships they form are within institutional domains. The figure 
also demonstrates, similarly to that in the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case, that conservation 
easements and contracts for management span institutional domains. Moreover, the legal requirements 
of the Adirondack Park Agency Act create links between state actors and market actors who are 
property owners.
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Table 9: Construction of Accountability Environment with Goals Mentioned in Finch Pruyn Case 
Domain Accountability Environment Goals Summary 
Domain Accountee Accountors Processes Types Nature Ecologic Economic Social 
State 
Adirondack 
Park Agency 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information Disclosure 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Recreation Plan, Road 
Access Plan 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Elected Officials Separation of Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
NY State 
Department of 
Environment 
and 
Conservation 
Public Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law, 
Information 
Disclosure, Rule of law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Recreation Plan, Road 
Access Plan 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Elected Officials Separation of Powers, 
Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law 
Administrative 
Procedure Act, 
Appointment Process, 
Budget Process 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Town of 
Newcomb 
Public Federalism, 
Constitutional Law 
Websites Mandatory 
 ● ● 
Adirondack Park 
Agency 
Rule of Law Adirondack Park 
Agency Act 
Mandatory 
●  ● 
Market 
Atlas Holdings 
Shareholders/ 
Public 
Disclosure Statements Website, Press 
Releases 
Voluntary 
 ●  
NYSDEC Contracts and Formal 
Agreements 
Conservation 
Easement 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
ATP 
Shareholders/ 
Public 
Disclosure Statements Annual Reports, Social 
Responsibility Reports, 
Websites 
Voluntary 
● ● ● 
NYSDEC Contracts and Formal 
Agreements 
Conservation 
Easement 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Adirondack Park 
Agency 
Legislative or 
Exchange 
Requirements 
Adirondack Park 
Agency Act 
Mandatory 
●  ● 
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Domain Accountability Environment Goals Summary 
Domain Accountee Accountors Processes Types Nature Ecologic Economic Social 
Blue Wolf 
Shareholders/ 
Public 
Disclosure Statements Websites Voluntary 
 ● ● 
Regions 
Timberland 
Shareholders/ 
Public 
Disclosure Statements Annual Reports, Social 
Responsibility Reports, 
Websites 
Voluntary 
● ● ● 
Regions Financial 
Corporation 
Disclosure Statements Annual Reports, 
Websites 
Voluntary 
● ●  
ATP Contracts, 
Performance 
Assessments 
Conservation 
Easement, Contract 
for Management 
Mandatory 
● ● ● 
Forest Stewardship 
Council 
External Certification External Certification Voluntary 
●  ● 
Civil 
Society 
Hunting Clubs 
Members Reports and 
Disclosure Statements 
By Laws Voluntary 
●  ● 
NY Department of 
Environmental 
Conservation 
Performance 
Assessments and 
Evaluations 
Hunting Laws Mandatory 
● ●  
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Figure 2: Finch Pruyn Case– Structure of Accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ELEC, 
ConL 
ELEC, 
ConL 
SOP, ConL, 
AdminL, BUD 
SOP, ConL, AdminL, BUD 
ConL, AdminL, InfoDis 
ConL, AdminL, InfoDis 
K 
KFA, 
PERF 
State Elected 
Officials 
 
ATP  
Hunting Clubs  
Atlas  
Shareholders/ 
Public (Market 
Participants) 
Public 
(Citizens) 
Regions 
Financial 
Finch Paper 
DIS 
FSC/SFI 
Market Actors 
Civil Society Actors 
State Actors 
Town of 
Newcomb  
Regions 
Timberland 
Adirondack Park 
Agency 
 
NYSDEC 
 
Actors internal to the governance arrangement are in grey circles. Actors external to the arrangement are in white squares. Arrows flow from accountor to accountee. Abbreviations are as 
follows: AdminL – administrative law; BUD – budget; CERT – certification; ConL – constitutional law; DIS – disclosures; ELEC – elections; FED – federalism; InfoDIs- Information disclosures; K – 
contracts; KFA – contracts or formal agreements; LegEx – legal or exchange requirements; RDS – reports and disclosure statements; SOP – separation of powers 
KFA 
KFA 
KFA 
KFA 
DIS 
DIS 
CERT 
LegEx 
FED, ConL 
KFA 
55 
 
Brief Comparison of Cases 
 In both the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters and Finch Pruyn cases, the visualization of 
accountability mechanisms demonstrates the dynamic nature of relationships. In both cases, actors in 
the state institutional domain demonstrate a networked accountability environment with checks 
between different actors. Most accountability mechanisms in both cases arise through constitutional 
and administrative law.  Within the market sector, both cases demonstrate a fairly hierarchical structure 
with accountability mechanisms in contracts forming important links between organizations. Finally, 
within the civil society sector, there are few relationships among actors. Moreover, most of these 
mechanisms are voluntary and rely on some form of self regulation.  
 The results of the content analysis demonstrate some differences between the two cases. The 
most striking difference is in the frequency that organizations mention environmental goals. In the 
Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case, environmental goals are less mentioned than either economic or 
social goals, with social goals being the most mentioned. In the Finch Pruyn case, environmental and 
economic goals are mentioned in the same frequency. Both categories of goals are spoken about less 
than social goals. These findings show that social goals are the most spoken about in both cases. 
Discussion 
 The discussion proceeds in three parts. The first two parts discuss what the accountability 
environment demonstrates about the various concerns that arise when forests result from parcelization 
and the division of property rights, and exhibit financialization and hybrid governance. Specific concerns 
that are addressed are the extent to institutional creation or blurring and the extent to which financial 
incentives are a major discourse in working forests. The third part discusses possible contests among 
and within organizations. First, I discuss the findings of the visual representation of the accountability 
structure. Specifically, I assert that this visual representation allows the analyst to see that parcelization 
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and division of property rights creates a complex accountability environment for the working forest. 
Further, through the analysis of both structure and goals, I assert there is little evidence of the 
institutional creation or blurring that is a defining characteristic of hybrid governance. Second, I discuss 
the goals of the financial actors as represented in accountability mechanisms. I assert that these 
mechanisms support previous research on the dominance of shareholder value and the 
disempowerment of owners by managers. Finally, I evaluate whether there is concern for contests 
among and within organizations in the working forest. I assert that evidence supports previous research 
on a possible lessening of contests among organizations. I, however, further state that there are 
concerns about contests within a few organizations in working forests.  
Accountability Structure and Its Relationship to Parcelization and Hybrid 
Governance 
 The visual representation of the accountability environment demonstrates the complexity of 
accountability relationships in these two forests. Findings demonstrate that each property right owner is 
embedded in different accountability relationships, each with different goals and possible sanctions. The 
amount of actors as well as the diversity of mechanisms may be a result of the parcelization and division 
of property rights processes. Specifically, this structure may be the result of organizations from different 
institutional domains buying parcels or holding different property rights in the working forest. 
 The visualization also shows the institutional context of the mechanisms. Most mechanisms 
create relationships between accountor and accountee within one institutional domain. This means that 
most property rights holders are not accountable to organizations embedded in different institutional 
domains. This finding is sensible within a neo-institutional understanding of accountability, where 
accountability is necessary for legitimacy, which is institution and grantor specific. Although this makes 
sense from a theoretical perspective, the finding does raise concerns already expressed in the forestry 
literature. As frequently discussed in the parcelization literature, adjacent property owners who manage 
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the land for different outcomes sometimes fragment forests and ecosystems. This could arguably be 
eliminated by some mechanism that ensures information sharing and mandates similar or 
complimentary management goals. Accountability mechanisms may be able to achieve this goal. The 
visualization, however, shows little evidence of accountability mechanisms building relationships among 
property rights holders who may have different management objectives. Although accountability 
mechanisms are not the only way for organizations to share information, the presence of mechanisms 
lessens concerns of forest and ecosystem fragmentation by ensuring some information flow among 
organizations.   
 The visualization of the accountability environment also demonstrates that there are structures 
of accountability relationships that vary by institutional domain. The state institutional domain in both 
cases has a fairly networked structure, linking property rights holders to each other and outside actors. 
The market institutional domain in both cases has a fairly hierarchical structure with accountability 
relationships among property rights holders built largely from contracts and other formal agreements. 
There are few actors in the civil society institutional domain in these two cases. Although it is difficult to 
draw a structure from the sparse civil society domain, it is apparent that there is self-accountability and 
self regulation. Networks in the state domain highlight many checks on legitimacy among actors. In the 
market domain, hierarchies of accountability ensure a delegation of specific tasks to different 
organizations, with each organization held accountable for these specific tasks. The self accountability 
and self regulation of civil society organizations demonstrates that these actors’ legitimacy is largely 
premised on adhering to their own goals and professional standards.   
 Although there is much evidence of institutional domain specific accountability relationships and 
structure, there is some evidence of institutional domain spanning accountability relationships. These 
relationships arise from agreements that are germane to the construction of these working forests, 
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specifically conservation easements and contracts for management. Through dividing rights, these 
mechanisms create accountability relationships between property rights holders in different 
institutional domains. The goals that arise in these mechanisms may be evidence of the creation of new 
or blurred institutional logics espoused in discussions of hybrid governance. The Finch Pruyn Case has 
more of these institutional domain spanning accountability relationships than the Connecticut Lakes 
Headwaters Case possibly as a result of several actors being parties to conservation easements and 
contractual obligations.  
 When amalgamated, these findings raise some concerns for working forests. First there is little 
evidence of new or blurred institutional logics pertaining to information sharing and multifunctionality. 
The structure of accountability shows that most accountability relationships exist within institutional 
domains rather than across them. These help to ensure information sharing and sanctions among 
organizations within institutional domains. This domain specificity may emphasize or reify certain 
existing institutional logics. When this finding is contextualized within the parcelization literature there 
is reason for concern. If information is not shared and logics of multifunctionality are not furthered, 
there is a risk of forest and ecosystem fragmentation.  
These concerns are somewhat lessened by the presence of relationships that span institutional 
domains. It is the goals mentioned in these institutional spanning mechanisms that may be evidence of 
blurred or institutional logics. To make a definite statement about hybrid governance, the analyst would 
have to weigh the various pulls of institutional domain specific or institutional domain spanning 
accountability mechanisms. Moreover, the analyst needs to assess the types of information sharing 
between organizations and the ability of organizations to mold the goals of other organizations through 
risk of sanction. The presence of blurred or new logics is essential for the operation of working forests as 
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they help to ensure that organizational legitimacy is at least in part premised on inclusion in the 
interorganizational arrangement and adherence to its institutions.     
Financial Actors in Working Forests 
 As stated above, the entrance of financial organizations into the forestry sector in the United 
States is not a new phenomenon (Gunnoe and Gellert 2011). The study of these actors within the 
context of working forests, however, is relatively new. The accountability environment and the goals 
mentioned in accountability mechanisms supports previous studies on financial organizations.  
 Every financial organization examined in these cases is accountable for the goals of maximizing 
shareholders’ returns on investment and diversifying portfolios to maximize investments. This clearly 
supports Fligstein's (1993) finding that modern corporate control is premised on shareholder value.  
This finding also supports assertions by forest scholars that the financialization of forests is guiding 
forest management towards returns on investment, rather than sustained profit maximization (Irland 
2007; Weinberg and Larson 2008; Gunnoe and Gellert 2011). 
 Moreover, the evidence presented by the nature and type of accountability mechanisms in 
these cases supports longstanding research about the possible disempowerment of ownership by 
management (Berle and Means 1933). All of the accountability mechanisms linking financial 
organizations to their investors and shareholders were voluntary information disclosures. As voluntary 
mechanisms allow the management of the organization to choose what information to disclose it might 
be argued to severely limit the ability of shareholders or investors to sanction the organization. If 
managers shape disclosures to maximize good information, minimize bad information, and lessen the 
power of owners to sanction, then managers clearly disempower owners. As discussed below, however, 
the ability for managers to concentrate power and minimize the risk of sanction via accountability 
mechanisms should be explored further. 
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Goals in Accountability Mechanisms: Evidence of Contests 
 The findings in both cases demonstrate that many accountors hold organizations in working 
forests accountable. The goals that are communicated in these accountability mechanisms vary by form 
and recipient. Through reference to Tables 8 and 9, the analyst may amalgamate goals across 
accountability mechanisms to develop an idea of the total goals organizations pursue. This process 
demonstrates that most organizations in both cases pursue a combination of economic, environmental, 
and social goals, with social and economic goals being the most mentioned. This apparent pursuit of 
multifunctionality may be evident from the goals in one accountability mechanism or in a combination 
of several accountability mechanisms. 
The finding that organizations pursue multiple goals, some of which are presumed to be outside 
their traditional interests, supports previous studies  (Klein and Wolf 2007; Neugarten, Wolf, and 
Stedman 2012). These previous studies assert that the perception of organizations pursuing multiple 
goals likely lessens potential contests among actors. Following from their conclusion, one might similarly 
conclude from the findings in this paper that there is the lessening of potential contests among 
organizations. The presence of contests, however, should be explored further, specifically by 
investigating actual practices. Looking at actual practices offers the analyst the ability to determine if the 
operationalization of goals leads to contests among actors. The cases presented here demonstrate a 
need for this level of analysis as some types of goals are spoken about in a higher frequency than others 
in accountability mechanisms. Moreover, not all environmental, social, or economic practices are 
complimentary. Although there may be little evidence of contests among organizations, this does not 
mean that there is no evidence of contests in these cases. 
As mentioned above, organizational goals setting processes are complex. Goals result from both 
negotiations between coalitions within organizations and pressures from external actors (Thompson and 
McEwen 1958; Perrow 1961; Cyert and March 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
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Official organizational goals reflect the outcome of these negotiations (Perrow 1961). Given limited 
resources, organizations cannot act on all the goals that coalitions or external actors would like to 
achieve (Cyert and March 1963; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978). Beyond this resource scarcity concern, 
coalitions or external actors with power influence which goals are pursued by the organization (Michels 
1915; Coleman 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  
Organizations in working forests espouse multiple goals in their accountability mechanisms. 
Based on previous studies, given scarce resources, organizations in working forests may not be able to 
achieve or operationalize all of the goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms. Moreover, which 
goals are listed in accountability mechanisms and operationalized are the result of negotiations among 
coalitions and between organizations and external actors. Coalitions may be differentially empowered in 
these negotiations, which could lead to contests among them. The goals stated in accountability 
mechanism obscure these negotiations and possible contests. Knowledge of the accountability 
environment, however, reduces this obscurity and offers some evidence as to which goals and coalitions 
may be favored within the organization.  
  The accountability environment offers evidence of differential empowerment of coalitions 
through detailing the relationships between accountor and accountee and through demonstrating the 
nature of accountability relationships. Describing the accountability environment allows the analyst to 
determine what goals each external actor (accountor) is pressuring the organization to pursue. This 
pressure is particularly important given the accountor’s ability to either grant or reduce legitimacy. 
Coalitions who pursue goals that receive support from accountors will likely have their goals furthered. 
These apparent power dynamics may lead to contests among coalitions. The accountability environment 
also exposes which goals an organization is mandated to pursue. Coalitions pursuing mandatory goals 
will likely have their goals furthered. As above, this power dynamic may lead to contests among 
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coalitions. The above assertions assume that organizations do not perform accountability, but rather 
that goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms are material.  
The findings of the two cases demonstrate evidence of possible contests among coalitions. To 
find evidence of possible contests within organizations, I look for organizations that: 1) mention 
different goals depending on the accountor; or 2) mention different goals depending on the nature of 
the mechanism; or both. Concerns are greatest when both of these phenomena occur. Many goals can 
be different, but concerns about contests will likely be highest when goals differ in terms of their 
environmental, economic, or social focus.  
   Evidence of possible contests is present in both cases. I will speak to examples where there are 
goals that differ both by accountor and nature of the accountability mechanism because they offer the 
greatest possibility of contests within organizations. Despite the findings presented here, more work is 
necessary to determine if contests are realized in practice.  
In the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case, The Nature Conservancy has three main accountors: 
donors, the federal government, and other NGOs. The accountability mechanisms linking The Nature 
Conservancy to donors mention environmental, economic, and social goals. These are voluntary 
mechanisms. The Nature Conservancy is accountable to both the government and other NGOs for 
economic goals. The accountability mechanisms in which the government is the accountor are 
mandatory. From the accountability environment, I observe that economic goals are present in all 
accountability mechanisms and they are the only goals mentioned in mandatory mechanisms. This 
demonstrates the possibility that coalitions focusing on economic goals within The Nature Conservancy 
may be more empowered relative to those focusing on environmental or social goals.  
Also in the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case, The Forestland Group is accountable to 
investors, the New Hampshire Division of Forest and Land, and the Connecticut Lakes Timber Company. 
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In voluntary accountability mechanisms where investors are the accountor, The Forestland Group 
mentions economic goals. In the contract to the Connecticut Lakes Timber Company, accountability 
mechanisms mention economic goals. Finally, in the mandatory conservation easement, the New 
Hampshire Division of Forests and Land holds The Forestland Group accountable to for environmental, 
economic, and social goals. All three accountors privilege economic goals. The importance of this goal is 
further highlighted by the mandatory nature of the contract with Connecticut Lakes Timber Company. 
The conservation easement creates a mandatory accountability mechanism that emphasizes both 
conservation and social goals in addition to economic goals. This accountability environment 
demonstrates the possible empowerment of coalitions focusing on economic goals relative to coalitions 
furthering other goals because economic goals are mentioned in all mechanisms and are mandated in 
two of them. The presence of social and environmental goals in the conservation easement does likely 
empower coalitions furthering those goals. It is, however, difficult to determine relative empowerment 
of coalitions within this organization.      
In the Finch Pruyn Case, Atlas is accountable to investors and New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation. Atlas is accountable to investors for only economic goals. This 
accountability relationship relies mostly on voluntary disclosures. Atlas is accountable to the New York 
State Department of Environmental Conservation for environmental, economic, and social goals. This 
relationship is based on a mandatory conservation easement. Economic goals are spoken about in both 
mechanisms. The mandatory nature of the conservation easement likely reinforces these economic 
goals, but also empowers coalitions whose goals focus on environmental and social goals. Similar to The 
Forestland Group, it is difficult to determine relative empowerment, but once again economic goals are 
featured in all mechanisms. 
64 
 
Although I find only three organizations that demonstrate accountability environments that give 
rise to concerns about contests within organizations, these three organizations are essential to the 
proper orchestration of the two working forests. The Nature Conservancy, in the New Hampshire case, 
holds the right to not develop the public lands.  The organization along with the New Hampshire Division 
of Forests and Land represent the only two conservation actors in the current property right 
arrangement. A focus on economic goals over conservation goals might upset donor’s assumptions and 
the overall multifunctionality of the forest. Also in the New Hampshire case, The Forestland Group is the 
largest land owner and controls LandVest’s management of the lands. Their apparent focus on economic 
goals strongly influences the way the land is managed, even when subject to the conservation easement. 
Finally, in the New York case, Atlas owns Finch Paper, which harvests timber on the land. Atlas is a key 
actor controlling Finch’s harvest subject to the conservation easement. Although constrained by the 
conservation easement, the organization may pressure Finch to pursue management premised largely 
on economic motives. 
The contests that may arise among or within these organizations may or may not be detrimental 
to the working forests. Generally, contests in and of themselves are not necessarily detrimental to the 
viability of organizations. In fact, contests may also allow an organization to adapt to an 
interorganizational environment thereby strengthening legitimacy. Contests, however, become 
problematic when they damage organizational legitimacy. Contests within working forests risk damaging 
legitimacy when coalitions fail to achieve or pursue goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms and 
accountors sanction the organization for this failure. This process emphasizes the link between internal 
and external contests. Contests that arise within an organization may lead to contests among 
organizations when goals are not operationalized.  
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Organizations that lose legitimacy through being engaged in the working forests will possibly 
dissociate depending on the importance of certain lost grants of legitimacy to their viability. Dissociation 
becomes more likely when organizations cannot abandon or change certain key goals and thereby can 
only realize diminished legitimacy by remaining part of the working forest. The dissociation of the key 
organizations mentioned above could have a detrimental impact on the viability of the working forest 
depending on the organization that replaces them. For instance, if The Nature Conservancy dissociated 
from the Connecticut Lakes Headwaters working forest key environmental concerns may be 
deemphasized, thereby shifting focus to social and environmental goals. To the extent that working 
forests are defined by multifunctionality, this loss of multifunctionality would end the working forest. 
Some of these concerns regarding dissociation may be minimized by the presence of conservation 
easements. Easements are generally attached to the land, not the owner. Therefore, in these working 
forests, new organizations that replace old organizations may be similarly bound to pursue 
multifunctionality under the easement.   
When all the analysis is taken together there is some reason for concern for the ongoing viability 
of working forests, but more work is necessary to more concretely assess their viability. The evidence 
presented here and in other studies demonstrates that there may be a weakening of contests among 
organizations because most organizations mention economic, environmental, and social goals. 
Organizations and outside actors perceive that their goals are being furthered and their concerns are 
being heard. Knowledge about the accountability environment allows that analyst to go beyond these 
findings and identify possible contests that arise within organizations. The findings from the structure of 
accountability relationships and the nature of accountability mechanisms highlight the possibility of 
contests within organizations. Contests within organizations may lead to contests among organizations 
when organizations do not operationalize all goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms. A failure to 
operationalize all goals creates a disparity between perceptions of multifunctionality and actual practice. 
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This disparity heightens risks of contest because organizations and stakeholders realize the failure to 
achieve goals.     
Conclusion 
 In the United States, multifunctionality has been an explicit or implicit goal in forest 
management for decades. This has lead to the designation of working forests – arguably defined 
synonymously with the pursuit of multifunctionality. Although multifunctionality holds favor in policy 
discourses, several scholars and practitioners have questioned its efficacy, especially in light of modern 
political economic contexts. Four characteristics of this modern context are explored in this paper: 
parcelization, division of property rights, financialization, and hybrid governance. Parcelization and 
division of property rights are seen as either explicit or implicit strategies to create working forests. 
Working forests exhibit financialization and hybrid governance. Each of these processes takes place in 
the context of a massive sale of forest land that began in the 1980s. The characteristics explored in this 
paper raise concerns of forest and ecosystem fragmentation, detrimental forest management, goal 
ambiguity, and contests among organizations.  
 This paper explores these concerns by evaluating two working forests in the United States 
through analyzing accountability mechanisms. Accountability mechanisms are necessary for 
organizational legitimacy. Legitimating actors (accountors) check on previous grants of legitimacy 
through accountability mechanisms. If the accountor is displeased with an organization’s performance, 
they can sanction the organization (accountee) diminishing legitimacy. I explored the accountability 
relationships in these two forests by reconstructing the accountability environment. This environment 
explicitly elucidates the relationship between accountor and accountee, the accountability mechanisms, 
the nature of the mechanism, the goals that the accountee is accountable for, and the possible sanction 
for the information.  
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 Accountability mechanisms also explicitly mention goals. These goals are important to the 
accountor for continued grants of legitimacy. In theory, failure to operationalize or achieve goals will 
damage legitimacy. Therefore, the content of accountability mechanisms demonstrates important goals 
for organizations. These goals are official goals of the organization, but they are evidence of the 
outcomes of ongoing negotiations among coalitions within organizations.   
In this paper, I searched for formal accountability mechanisms for each actor who held property 
rights. I re-created the accountability environment for each of these organizations. I also completed a 
qualitative content analysis on the accountability mechanism, searching for goals. I then transformed 
this data into a visual representation of the structure of accountability environment and tables 
demonstrating the simplified goals held in each type of accountability mechanism.    
 The accountability environment and the goals within accountability mechanisms support three 
findings. First, the structure of accountability relationships is complicated by parcelization and the 
division of property rights. Most property rights holders are accountable within their institutional 
domain with few accountability mechanisms linking organizations across institutional domains. This 
finding highlights the lack of information sharing across institutional domains via accountability 
mechanisms. Moreover, the structure of relationships also provides little evidence of institutional 
blurring or the creation of new institutional logics underlying hybrid governance. The failure to use 
accountability mechanisms to share information across domains and to create new institutional logics 
premised on multifunctionality heightens concerns of forest and ecosystem fragmentation arising from 
parcelization and division of property rights.  
Second, the goals espoused by financial actors support previous work on the new management 
of forests. Specifically, the findings here demonstrate a strong focus on returns on investment as a 
major motivation underlying forest harvest and conservation. Moreover, the voluntary nature of 
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accountability mechanisms linking owners and managers hints at the possible disempowerment of 
owners by managers. Although not necessarily detrimental to the functioning of working forests, this 
evidence reinforces previous studies on a shift in forest management motivations. This shift is 
particularly salient in attempts to realize multifunctionality as economic goals are some of the most 
frequent goals mentioned in accountability mechanisms. 
Third, analysis of accountability relationships, the nature of accountability mechanisms, and the 
goals mentioned in mechanisms support previous findings on a possible lessening of contests among 
organizations as each organization is seen to pursue a suite of economic, environmental, and social 
goals. These findings, however, do not mean that there are no contests. Rather contests may still exist 
among organizations as goals are operationalized. The analysis in this paper goes further than previous 
studies in demonstrating evidence of possible contests within organizations. These contests arise as 
coalitions negotiate for which goals are furthered. Accountability mechanisms offer evidence of 
differential empowerment. Coalitions furthering goals that are mentioned in multiple and mandatory 
accountability mechanisms will be more empowered relative to those coalitions furthering goals in 
singular and voluntary mechanisms. In the cases presented in this paper, there are three organizations 
that offer evidence of contests among coalitions.  
These possible contests both among and within organizations are not necessarily damaging to 
organizational legitimacy. Rather contests become damaging when organizations do not achieve goals 
that are necessary for legitimacy. One way that contests damage legitimacy is when contests either 
among or within organizations lead to failed goal attainment and accountors sanction organizations for 
this failure. Organizations that realize damaged legitimacy may dissociate from the working forest. 
Dissociation may not be detrimental to working forest viability. Dissociation becomes detrimental when 
new or existing organizations fail to pursue multifunctionality. The problems arising from dissociation 
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may be diminished by constraints of conservation easements and other legal mechanisms because they 
can bind future property rights holders’ activities.  
In review, this paper demonstrates that there are some concerns for working forests that exhibit 
parcelization, division of property rights, financialization, hybrid governance. Evidence from the 
visualization of the accountability environment demonstrates little evidence of institutional domain 
spanning accountability relationships. The absence of information sharing that results from 
accountability mechanisms raises concerns about forest and ecosystem fragmentation. These concerns 
are alleviated by conservation easements and other legal mechanisms that create accountability 
relationships that span institutional domains. Evidence from the content analysis demonstrates the 
goals that are important to organizations in working forests. The goals that are most spoken about in 
accountability mechanisms are economic and social goals. Many of the economic goals pertain to 
financial incentives, thus demonstrating the impact of the financialization of forests. When goals are 
amalgamated across accountability mechanisms, it is clear that most organizations pursue 
multifunctionality in both cases. Based on previous studies, this should lessen the risk of contests among 
actors. By critical review of accountability mechanisms, however, I find evidence of possible contests 
within organizations. The possibility of these contests has yet to be studied by investigating 
organizational practices as well as internal organizational dynamics. If contests are realized, there is 
concern for the viability of working forests. This concern is premised on the idea that organizations may 
dissociate thus introducing the risk that the interorganizational arrangement may not longer pursue 
multifunctionality.  
To reach more definitive findings on these cases and other working forests, future work should 
investigate three areas. First, to explore the assumption that goals in voluntary mechanisms are less 
privileged than those in mandatory mechanisms, researchers should investigate how organizations may 
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use voluntary mechanisms to build legitimacy without risk of sanction. Findings from this research will 
also speak to the possible performance of accountability by accountees. Second, to explore the 
assumption that accountors are privileged external actors that help to determine organizational goals, 
analysts should determine the extent to which accountors act or are empowered to act on the 
information provided within accountability mechanisms. Third, analysts should determine the extent to 
which possible contests between goals in accountability mechanisms manifest themselves in 
organizational practice. As mentioned throughout the paper, goals as spoken about in accountability 
mechanisms may be complimentary or conflict depending on how they are operationalized. 
Accountability mechanisms do not necessarily mention how goals are put into practice. Therefore, 
future work should investigate actual organizational practice and how it relates to goals mentioned in 
accountability mechanisms. 
Although more research needs to be completed to definitively evaluate these working forests, 
the findings presented in this paper highlight possible concerns. From the findings presented in this 
paper, analysts now have knowledge about the structure of accountability, the key relationships 
between legitimating and legitimated actors, and the goals expressed within these relationships in two 
complex working forests. Moreover, when findings are evaluated together, there is evidence of contests 
within organizations. The extent to which these contests are realized or detrimentally impact legitimacy 
is yet to be seen. Modern working forests have the potential to realize multifunctionality; however, this 
is contingent upon the proper structures, like accountability mechanisms, ensuring management 
towards this end.     
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APPENDIX 1: Accountability Environment and Goal Content for All Actors Who Own Property Rights 
in Connecticut Lakes Headwaters Case (June 2013) 
 
Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
Civil 
Society 
  The Nature 
Conservancy 
Donors/Public Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) The Conservancy’s management goals are simply to 
preserve the natural character of the land and to provide 
for passive recreation, nature study and education. To 
that end, the Conservancy built the existing trail around 
Fourth Lake in 1995 
Civil 
Society 
  The Nature 
Conservancy 
Donors/Public Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) Of course, the Conservancy also has a long history of 
working with local, state and federal entities to establish 
and expand popular and iconic places; 2) The 
Conservancy transferred the 25,000-acre Connecticut 
Lakes Natural Area property to New Hampshire Fish & 
Game in 2002 and retains a conservation easement. 
Civil 
Society 
2006-
2009 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Donors/Public Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements 
Annual Report Voluntary 1) conservation, 2) public policy, 2) community 
engagement, 3) sustainable development, 4) 
partnerships 
Civil 
Society 
2006-
2009 
The Nature 
Conservancy 
Federal 
Government/Donors/Public 
Reports and 
Disclosure 
Statements 
IRS 990 Form Mandatory 1) mission; 2) land transactions 
Civil 
Society 
  The Nature 
Conservancy 
Donors/Public Performance 
Assessments and 
Evaluations 
Financial 
Statements; 
Voluntary 1) independent auditor of finance; 2) money use 
Civil 
Society 
2012 The Nature 
Conservancy 
Other NGOs/Public/Donors Self Regulation Charity Navigator 
Criteria 
Voluntary 1) access to annual reports and IRS 990 forms; 2) where 
land goes 
Civil 
Society 
2012 The Nature 
Conservancy 
Other NGOs/Public/Donors Self Regulation Better Business 
Bureau Criteria 
Voluntary 1) access to annual reports and IRS 990 forms; 2) where 
land goes 
Civil 
Society 
2012 The Nature 
Conservancy 
Other NGOs/Public/Donors Self Regulation American Institute 
of Philanthropy 
Criteria 
Voluntary 1) access to annual reports and IRS 990 forms; 2) where 
land goes 
Civil 
Society 
2012 The Nature 
Conservancy 
Media/Public/Donors Self Regulation Forbes Magazine 
Criteria 
Voluntary 1) access to annual reports and IRS 990 forms; 2) where 
land goes 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
Market   The Forestland 
Group 
Shareholders/ Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) emphasizes naturally regenerating hardwood and 
some softwood forests; 2) carefully administered 
harvesting during the management phase enables TFG to 
generate periodic cash flow for investors and accelerate 
the biological growth of the remaining timber; 3) 
Forestland management plans are designed on a tract-
by-tract basis, paying careful attention to each property's 
unique biological habitat and diversity. 
Market 2009 The Forestland 
Group 
Shareholders/ Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Press Release Voluntary 1) “working forest conservation easement” that 
permanently protects this land from fragmentation and 
development, assures public access and requires 
sustainable forest management practices; 2) LandVest 
will manage 
Market   The Forestland 
Group 
Shareholders/ Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) forest harvesting 
Market   The Forestland 
Group 
Connecticut Lakes Timber 
Company 
Contract or Other 
Formal Agreement 
Firewood Supply 
Agreement 
Mandatory 1) Harvesting firewood subject to permit; 2) The 
maximum number of cords that may be removed under a 
permit will be three. Only one permit will be issued per 
Licensee. Wood is for personal use only, not for sale or 
resale to others; 3) Firewood must be cut only from 
logging residues and dead and down trees. 
Market   LandVest 
Timberland 
group 
The Forestland Group Contract or Other 
Formal Agreement 
Contract to Manage Mandatory 1)  must be in line with WFCE; 2) harvest woods to 
maximize value 
Market   LandVest 
Timberland 
group 
Shareholders/ Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) LandVest provides each client with a dedicated project 
team drawn from whichever of these three disciplines 
they require. With these combined efforts, LandVest is 
able to deliver the highest quality service and clear 
solution, no matter how complex the property or 
situation; 2) LandVest has been a leader in utilizing 
technology to offer superior and more comprehensive 
services in the most user-friendly and visually pleasing 
way; 3) If you are considering selling or purchasing real 
estate, wish to protect your property, preserve it for the 
next generation, or learn more about timberland 
investing, please call us to learn more about LandVest's 
services  
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
Market   LandVest 
Timberland 
group 
Shareholders/Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) Financial analysis of stands, forests and timberland 
investments is a core discipline at LandVest. We apply 
discounted cash flow analysis to solve for optimal 
solutions, have dedicated in-house programs, and a MS 
Forest Economist on staff; 2) We believe understanding 
and implementing proper silviculture does produce 
superior investment results. We have 40 years 
experience and proven results that support that view; 3) 
Our staff has expertise in Woodstock, USFS Twigs FVS 
and Flex Fiber modeling programs. Our in-house program 
(SIMULATE II) estimates Internal Rate of Return from 
stand- type characteristics and optimization treatments; 
4) WFCE and certification consulting; 5) LandVest plans 
use stand type level growth and yield modeling with 
associated financial analysis to achieve property owner 
objectives. Plans are capable of meeting state tax 
programs and FSC/SFI certification programs as well 
Market   LandVest 
Timberland 
group 
Shareholders/ Public Disclosure 
Statements 
Website Voluntary 1) We address the common and the complex problems 
surrounding acquisition, through ongoing management, 
to disposition planning. Our project specific work is 
shaped by individual client needs and objectives;  2) 
Helping Property Owners Make Informed Decisions; 3) 
Identifying, valuing, and marketing Higher and Better Use 
(HBU) properties within a timberland portfolio; 
Appraising and marketing large conservation easements; 
Providing a disposition, marketing, and strategy plan on 
large timberland properties; Execution of the wholesale 
disposition process; Serving as an expert witness in 
resource litigation; Providing a third-party opinion of 
fairness on a syndicated credit facility financing a 
timberland acquisition; Assisting buyers in arranging 
financing for large acquisitions, or Conducting market 
research.  
Market   The Forestland 
Group 
The State of New Hampshire 
Division of Parks and 
Recreation 
Contract or Other 
Formal Agreement 
Recreational Plan   Mandatory 1) The Easement Holder, in consultation with the State 
agencies that have regulatory and programmatic 
responsibilities for administration or monitoring of the 
Easement, may submit to the Fee Owner, for its 
approval, amendments; 2) The Easement Holder shall 
prepare a new or updated Five Year Road Management 
Plan every five years; 3) Pisgah Bridge – Total 
replacement estimated at $35,000 - $50,000. Will seek to 
include in State Capital budget and to also find 
alternative funding; 4) Snowmobile use, and dam 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
construction; biking, ATV, equestrian 
Market   The Forestland 
Group 
The State of New Hampshire    Contract or Other 
Formal Agreement 
Conservation 
Easement   
Mandatory 1) The Easement Holder, in consultation with the State 
agencies that have regulatory and programmatic 
responsibilities for administration or monitoring of the 
Easement, may submit to the Fee Owner, for its 
approval, amendments; 2) The Easement Holder shall 
prepare a new or updated Five Year Road Management 
Plan every five years; 3) Pisgah Bridge – Total 
replacement estimated at $35,000 - $50,000. Will seek to 
include in State Capital budget and to also find 
alternative funding; 4) Snowmobile use, and dam 
construction; biking, ATV, equestrian 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
New Hampshire Department 
of Resources and Economic 
Development 
Administrative Law NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) Internal Reporting 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
The Public Rule of Law/ 
Administrative Law 
/ Contracts 
Recreational Plan   Mandatory 1) The Easement Holder, in consultation with the State 
agencies that have regulatory and programmatic 
responsibilities for administration or monitoring of the 
Easement, may submit to the Fee Owner, for its 
approval, amendments; 2) The Easement Holder shall 
prepare a new or updated Five Year Road Management 
Plan every five years; 3) Pisgah Bridge – Total 
replacement estimated at $35,000 - $50,000. Will seek to 
include in State Capital budget and to also find 
alternative funding; 4) Snowmobile use, and dam 
construction; biking, ATV, equestrian 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Public Information 
Disclosure 
Website Mandatory 1) Publicize the area to bring money to the community; 
cooperative partnership including 
sponsorship/commercial/volunteer; Classification of the 
roads (what is legal and illegal) – need to have connector 
routes for ATV use; Communication among the various 
user groups, 
state/landowner/leases/recreational/community; Must 
remember landowner rights – CLH property, community 
landowners, & lessees. Everyone needs input. Big 
Government shouldn’t make a mess; Sandy Young as a 
local manager helps in management. Need education of 
the public and landowner; Include carriage driving along 
with saddle riders;   
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Public Information 
disclosure 
Press Release Voluntary 1) Designating a route for ATVs to cross the headwaters 
property linking trail systems in Pittsburg with trail 
systems in Errol and Colebrook, developing an equestrian 
use plan in cooperation with local riders, and creating 
safe off-highway parking areas along Route 3.  In addition 
as the low head dams on the property are reconstructed, 
the Division of Parks and Recreation will work with NH 
Fish and Game Department to construct and maintain 
public use facilities.  
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Public Administrative 
Law/Professional 
Rules 
NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1)  notice and comment 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Constitutio
nal Law/ 
Administrative Law 
Appointment 
Process 
Mandatory 1) manage the agency 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) financial performance 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Public Administrative 
Law/Judicial 
Review 
NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) notice and comment for major agency proceedings 
State   New Hampshire 
Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Public Constitutional 
Law/Administrative 
Law 
Constitution Mandatory 1) public performance 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
State   New Hampshire 
Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Constitutio
nal Law/ 
Administrative Law 
Constitution Mandatory 1) mange the agency 
State   New Hampshire 
Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) financial performance 
State   New Hampshire 
Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Public Constitutional 
Law/Administrative 
Law 
NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) notice and comment for major agency proceedings 
State   New Hampshire 
Department of 
Resources and 
Economic 
Development 
Public/Elected Officials Information 
Disclosure 
Website Voluntary 1) Nearly five million acres of forest land sustain a 
thriving forest products industry; New Hampshire's 
parks, beaches, historic sites, and ski mountains provide 
endless recreation opportunities; and the state's tourism 
industry offers a wide array of dining, lodging, cultural 
and entertainment  
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Constitutio
nal Law/ 
Administrative Law 
Appointment 
Process 
Mandatory 1) mange the agency 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) financial performance 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public Constitutional 
Law/Administrative 
Law 
NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) notice and comment for major agency proceedings 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public/Elected Officials Information 
Disclosure 
Website Voluntary 1) Division of Forests and Lands protects and promotes 
the values provided by trees and forests; 2) Our mission 
is accomplished through responsible management of the 
State's forested resources; by providing forest resource 
information and education to the public; and the 
protection of these resources for the continuing benefit 
of the State's citizens, visitors, and forest industry; 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
New Hampshire Department 
of Resources and Economic 
Development 
Administrative Law Constitution Mandatory 1) notice and comment  
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public Information 
Disclosure 
Website Voluntary 1) mapping 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public/New Hampshire 
Department of Revenue 
Administration 
Rule of Law/ 
Administrative Law  
Land Transaction 
Record 
Mandatory 1) Show all deeds and other land transactions 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Governor/legislature Separation of 
powers/ Rule of 
Law 
Constitution Mandatory 1) Grants the Governor and Executive Council authority 
for the acquisition of land for state parks and forests. RSA 
4:40 authorizes the Governor and Executive Council to 
sell, lease or otherwise convey state land with the 
recommendation of the head of the department having 
jurisdiction over the land. 
State   New Hampshire 
Division of 
Forests and 
Land 
Public/Legislature Information 
Disclosures 
Forest Health 
Newsletters 
Voluntary 1) reports on general issues of forest health 
State   New Hampshire 
Fish and Game 
Department 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Constitutio
nal Law/ 
Administrative Law 
Constitution Mandatory 1) mange the agency 
State   New Hampshire 
Fish and Game 
Department 
Elected Officials Separation of 
Powers/Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) financial performance 
State   New Hampshire 
Fish and Game 
Department 
Public Constitutional 
Law/Administrative 
Law 
NH Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) notice and comment for major agency proceedings 
State   New Hampshire 
Fish and Game 
Department 
Public Information 
Disclosure 
Website Voluntary 1)  Conserve, manage and protect these resources and 
their habitats; Inform and educate the public about these 
resources; and Provide the public with opportunities to 
use and appreciate these resources. 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are 
they Accountable (Goals Language) 
State   The State of 
New Hampshire 
Division of Parks 
and Recreation 
Public/Elected Officials Information 
Disclosure 
Website Voluntary 1) New initiatives include designating a route for ATVs to 
cross the headwaters property linking trail systems in 
Pittsburg with trail systems in Errol and Colebrook, 
developing an equestrian use plan in cooperation with 
local riders, and creating safe off-highway parking areas 
along Route 3. In addition as the low head dams on the 
property are reconstructed, the Division of Parks and 
Recreation will work with NH Fish and Game Department 
to construct and maintain public use facilities. 
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APPENDIX 2: Accountability Environment and Goal Content for All Actors Who Own Property Rights 
in Finch Pruyn Case (June 2013) 
 
Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are they 
Accountable (Goals Language) 
Civil Society   Hunting Clubs Public Information Disclosures Website Voluntary 1) It’s about being able to place one foot in front of the other 
acre after acre, mile after mile without cutting a trail, 
intruding on somebody's back yard, or being distracted by 
the hum of a highway. It's about always having the high 
peaks on your horizon; it's about the expectation of seeing 
some rare wildlife; of feeling you're in a spot in a swamp 
where no one else has been before; about being faced with 
your own self reliance; of the adventure inherent in the 
possibility of being really lost in a spruce thicket (hopefully 
only a temporary situation). 
Civil Society   Hunting Clubs Hunting club 
members 
Reports and Disclosure 
Statements 
By-laws Mandatory 1) ensure only members use club properties; 2) ensure 
compliance with applicable laws, including conservation laws; 
3) all members are asked to join a committee, participation is 
voluntary 
Civil Society   Hunting Clubs NYSDEC Rule of Law Hunting Laws Mandatory It is illegal to take or hunt wildlife: 1) while in or on a motor 
vehicle; 2) with the aid of vehicle lights; 3) on any public 
road; 4) with a silencer; 5) with an automatic firearm; 6) with 
a spear; 7) with a bow equipped with a mechanical device 
that is attached to another bow; 8) with a pear gun; 9) with 
an arrow with an explosive head; 10) with any device that 
delivers drugs to the animal 
Market 2009 ATP Shareholders 
Market 
Disclosure Statements Annual Report Voluntary 1) Sustainable forest management 
Market 2010 ATP Shareholders/Ma
rket 
Disclosure Statements Annual Report Voluntary 1) incorporating environmental, social, and governance 
issues as part of its corporate social responsibility issues; 2) 
environmental responsibility 
Market 2010 ATP Shareholders/Ma
rket 
Disclosure Statements Responsibility 
Report 
Voluntary 1) Environment and society section -sustainable buildings and 
operations; 2) Integrates sustainability into investments, 
including forests; 3) the UNFCCC and COP. 
Market 2011 ATP Shareholders/Ma
rket 
Disclosure Statements Annual Report Voluntary 1) commitment to environmental stewardship; 2) invest in 
forestry property 
Market 2011 ATP Shareholders/Ma
rket 
Disclosure Statements Responsibility 
Report 
Voluntary 1) sustainable building and operations; 2)responsible 
investments, including adhering to the UN PRI; 3) 
Investments in forests is predicated on good involvement of 
local populations 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are they 
Accountable (Goals Language) 
Market   Blue Wolf Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1) Blue Wolf, along with Atlas, purchased the Finch lands. 
Market   Blue Wolf Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1) States what it takes for Blue Wolf to invest 
Market   Blue Wolf Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1) Environment and socially responsible investments 
Market 2011 Regions 
Timberland 
Shareholders/Ma
rket 
Disclosure Statements Annual Report Voluntary 1) Regions Timberland efforts to build economically and 
environmentally beneficial investments 
Market   Regions 
Timberland 
Forest 
Stewardship 
Council 
External Certification FSC Certification Voluntary 1.  Maintenance of soil productivity. 2.  Conservation of 
water quality, wetlands, and riparian zones. 3.  Maintenance 
or creation of a healthy balance of forest age classes.  4.  
Continuous flow of timber, pulpwood, and other forest 
products. 5.  Improvement of the overall quality of the timber 
resource as a foundation for more value-added 
opportunities. 6.  Maintenance of scenic quality by limiting 
adverse aesthetic impacts of forest harvesting, particularly in 
high-elevation areas and vistas. 7.  Conservation and 
enhancement of habitats that support a full range of native 
flora and fauna. 8.  Protection of unique or fragile areas. 9.  
Continuation of opportunities for traditional recreation. 
Market   Regions 
Timberland 
Sustainable 
Forest Initiative 
External Certification SFI Certification Voluntary 1) Forest Management Planning; 2) Forest Productivity; 3) 
Conservation of biological diversity; 4)Protection and 
Maintenance of Water Resources; 5)Management of Visual 
Quality and Recreational benefits; 6) Protection of Special 
Cites; 7) Efficient use of the forest; 8) Landowner outreach; 
9)Use of qualified resource and logging professionals; 10) 
adherence to best management practices; 11) propose 
conservation of biological diversity (including hotspots); 
12)avoidance of controversial sources of illegal logging; 13) 
Avoidance of fiber sourced from areas without effective 
social laws; 14) Legal and regulatory compliance; 15) Forest 
research, science, and technology; 16) training and 
education; 17) community involvement; 18) Public land 
management responsibilities; 19) Communications and public 
reports; 20) Management review and continual improvement 
Market   Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1) Atlas Holdings is a diversified group of manufacturing, 
distribution, service and trading businesses that operate in 
the building materials, capital equipment, energy, industrial 
services, packaging, pulp, paper, and tissue, steel, and 
logistics, supply chain management and distribution 
segments.  
Market   Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1) Atlas Holdings practices a unique and focused approach to 
growing our companies and entering new industries, 
centered around investing in businesses undergoing complex 
financial and operational challenges in business sectors 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are they 
Accountable (Goals Language) 
where we have substantial domain expertise. 
Market   Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Website Voluntary 1)  Finch sets itself apart by providing innovative solutions 
and exceptional service to help customers adapt to the 
changing print world. Using advanced manufacturing 
systems, the 700-employee company produces papers 
designed for multi-press environments and is ideal for 
corporate marketing materials, direct mail, book publishing, 
and business office uses. 
Market   Finch Paper Atlas Holdings Contractual or Other 
Formal Agreement 
Contract Mandatory  
Market 2011 Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Press Release Voluntary 1) Finch Paper is discussed in Atlas's press release about third 
quarter earnings through purchase 
Market 2007 Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Press Release Voluntary 1) Atlas purchased Finch Paper 
Market 2007 Atlas Holdings Public/Investors Disclosure Statements Press Release Voluntary 1) Atlas partners with the Nature Conservancy for sustainable 
forest management 
State   Adirondack 
Park Agency 
Courts/Public/Ot
her 
Governmental 
Actors 
Separation of 
Powers/Rule of Law 
NY Environmental 
Quality Act 
Mandatory 1) Environmental Impact Assessment 
State   Adirondack 
Park Agency 
Courts/Public/Ot
her 
Governmental 
Actors 
Judicial Review/Rule of 
Law 
Adirondack Park 
Agency Act, NY 
Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) Performance of goals under law 
State   Adirondack 
Park Agency 
Courts/Public/Ot
her 
Governmental 
Actors 
Separation of 
Powers/Administrative 
Law 
NY Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) Each project and regulation must go through some form of 
notice and comment procedure 
State   NYSDEC Public/Courts Judicial 
Review/Separation of 
Powers/ Administrative 
Law 
NY Administrative 
Procedure Act 
Mandatory 1) Each project and regulation must go through some form of 
notice and comment procedure 
State   NYSDEC Public/Legislatur
e 
Separation of Powers/ 
Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) Budget and performance 
State   Adirondack 
Park Agency 
Public/Legislatur
e 
Separation of Powers/ 
Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) Budget and performance 
State   NYSDEC Public/Legislatur
e 
Separation of 
Powers/Budget 
Constitution Mandatory 1) Budget and performance 
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Domain Year Accountee Accountor Category of 
Mechanism 
Actual 
Mechanisms 
Nature On What Aspect of Their Conduct Are they 
Accountable (Goals Language) 
State   NYSDEC Attorney 
General/ Courts/ 
Public 
Judicial Review/Rule of 
Law 
Constitution Mandatory 1) Budget and performance 
State   NYSDEC Attorney 
General/ Courts/ 
Public 
Judicial Review/Rule of 
Law 
Constitution Mandatory how the money is spent; In the Finch deal, locals first said 
they paid over fair market value, and now locals are alleging 
that the deal they were pressured into was unfair and 
negotiated properly 
State   Town of 
Newcomb 
Citizens Federalism/Constitutiona
l Law/ Elections 
Constitution Mandatory 1) elections 
State   Town of 
Newcomb 
Citizens Information Disclosures Website Voluntary 1) Newcomb is ideal for resource based industry. Our 
industrial land can accommodate larger businesses, while 
small wood products/resource based businesses could 
operate on a smaller piece of commercial property, taking 
advantage of the Adirondack made label. 
State   NYSDEC Public Information Disclosures Website Voluntary Map of land holdings in NY state; conservation 
 
